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As the popularity of continued involvement in Afghanistan begins to decline and talk of a 
coordinated exit becomes more prevalent, international efforts to contain Afghanistan’s health 
crisis develop a new sense of urgency.  Despite struggles to improve health, there has been 
significant progress in certain areas.  Programs that target specific diseases have boosted 
immunization rates.  Tremendous strides have also been made in expanding access to care in 
rural areas.  But serious challenges remain, in particular maternal health.  If not properly 
addressed, Afghanistan will remain at the bottom of the rankings on maternal mortality.  Given 
the conditions for women in Afghanistan, a health issue in such urgent need cannot afford to be 
ignored. 
 
In this paper, I argue that comprehensive delivery of health services must include a stronger 
commitment to lowering mortality rates through innovative and targeted methods.  Efforts to 
improve the health sector must take a “diagonal” approach, using low-skilled health workers as 
community-level representatives while working to continue the sector-wide improvements 
currently underway.  While the sector-wide approach has expanded access to care and improved 
oversight of services delivered, it has not produced improvements in key health indicators such 
as maternal health.  Health experts must work to bridge the divide between vertical approaches 
that target particular indicators and horizontal approaches that focus on the health system as a 
whole.   
 
Mortality rates will remain high and improvements in the health sector will go unnoticed if 
further efforts are not made to promote the utilization of health services, especially by pregnant 
women.  Working to further incorporate pregnant women into the health sector will result in 
declining mortality rates and will further legitimize the efforts of the central government by 
demonstrating its capacity to provide essential public services. 
 
Keeping in mind Afghanistan’s immense health crisis and the need to improve its deficient 
managerial capacity, the most sensible approach to improving the health system should be 
neither exclusively vertical nor horizontal but rather a combination of both, with a focus on 
vertical efforts to educate pregnant women about the need to utilize health services and promote 
healthy lifestyle choices relating to breastfeeding and nutrition.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Nearly a decade after the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and hundreds of 
millions of dollars spent on reconstruction efforts, the nation’s health statistics are still some of 
the worst in the world.  Afghanistan has been experiencing a public health crisis for many 
decades.  In the early years of the post-Taliban era, reports showed that one child in four died 
before the age of five.1  Currently, Afghanistan is home to the second highest maternal mortality 
rate in the world.2  It also has the fourth highest rate of reported malaria cases outside of sub-
Saharan Africa, made worse by forced migration and internally displaced persons.3 
The United States has spent over $4 billion on development in Afghanistan since 2002, 
according to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).4  On health 
programs alone USAID has spent or allocated $628 million, according to the annual budgets 
from fiscal years 2002 through 2009.5  The World Bank, another major contributor to 
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, committed over $1.5 billion to development projects from 
                                                
1 Richards, Tessa and Little, Ruth. “Afghanistan needs security to rebuild its health services.” British Medical 
Journal, Vol. 324, No. 7333. 2002, p. 318 
2 “Maternal mortality rate high in Afghanistan: U.N.” Reuters India. 26 January 2009. 
3 “Malaria indicators survey.” Ministry of Public Health. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2009, p. i 
4 USAID Afghanistan Mission Website, About USAID/Afghanistan, 
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Page.About.aspx 
5 Ibid, Programs, Health, http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Program.28.aspx 
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2002 to 2008.6  The European Commission (EC), the third major donor, has committed !1.65 
billion ($2.13 billion) to Afghanistan from 2002 until 2009.7  Despite the commitment of billions 
of dollars to improve health conditions in Afghanistan, the nation’s staggeringly high mortality 
rates have not seen a significant decline.  Though some health experts are optimistic that 
mortality rates will improve in the future, it is not clear whether the reduction will be statistically 
significant – if it even happens at all.  
As the popularity of continued involvement in Afghanistan begins to decline in the United 
States and talk of a coordinated exit becomes more prevalent, international efforts to contain 
Afghanistan’s immense public health crisis develop a new sense of urgency.  But with an 
overwhelming majority of health care funds coming from the international community rather 
than from within Afghanistan and with the prevalence of health workers employed through non-
local organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), efforts to 
provide Afghanistan with a sustainable health system seem to be many years away.   
Afghanistan’s health crisis is not limited to specific health maladies, however.  The nation’s 
health system infrastructure is in a particularly dire state, though considerable improvements 
have been made in the past few years.  Many hospitals are falling apart, few have electricity and 
running water, and the terrain surrounding many facilities is so damaged as to leave them 
inaccessible.  Skilled health professionals are uncommon, female health workers in particular are 
incredibly scarce, and most health facilities are badly understaffed.   
This grim reality raises an important question: keeping in mind the limited resources 
available in Afghanistan, how can public health be improved in the short term, while still tending 
to long-term needs?  In other words, what kind of strategy would be most appropriate for a 
                                                
6 “Country Update.” The World Bank in Afghanistan. 2008, p. 2 
7 “Afghanistan state of play July 2009.” European Commission. 2009, p. 1 
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government seeking to tackle an immense public health crisis in the short term while also 
working to develop a health system that is cost-effective, accessible, and maintainable?   
Despite struggles to improve health care outcomes, there have been significant improvements 
in certain areas.  Programs that target specific diseases have been very successful in boosting 
immunization rates for polio and measles.  Tremendous strides have also been made in 
improving the health sector by working to expand access to care, especially in rural areas.  But 
serious challenges remain that need to be tackled, in particular maternal health.  If not addressed 
in the short term, Afghanistan will remain at the bottom of the rankings on maternal mortality 
and other related indicators such as neonatal health.  Maternal health is a key indicator that can 
significantly impact broader issues of health, such as child health, nutrition, and overall life 
expectancies.  Though there has been dramatic improvement in quality of health services, 
mortality rates remain astronomically high.  Unless they are adequately addressed and 
prioritized, it is possible that these numbers could begin to increase once more, keeping 
Afghanistan among the worst nations for human development. 
One reason maternal mortality has not been adequately addressed is largely due to the 
international community’s approach to reforming health services in the country.  Specifically, 
donors have mostly taken a broad horizontal approach that works to improve health services 
sector-wide and focuses on improving the managerial capacity of facilities at the expense of 
targeting specific crises.  A sector-wide or horizontal approach to improving health services is 
one that works to address the infrastructure of health delivery as a whole and improve the health 
sector so that the entire population benefits.  In contrast, a vertical approach focuses on a specific 
demographic population or disease and works to improve a particular health issue, usually within 
a specified timeframe.  While horizontal efforts to improve health in Afghanistan have 
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demonstrated considerable progress and are worth continuing, such efforts often lack the ability 
to effectively improve narrower issues such as maternal health.  Given the dismal conditions for 
women in Afghanistan, a health issue in such urgent need cannot afford to be ignored. 
In this paper, I argue that comprehensive delivery of health services in Afghanistan needs to 
include a stronger commitment to lowering mortality rates through innovative and targeted 
methods.  Efforts to improve the health sector must take a more inclusive “diagonal” approach, 
incorporating low-skilled health workers as community-level representatives while working to 
continue the sector-wide improvements currently underway.  While the horizontally-driven 
sector-wide approach has expanded access to care and improved oversight of services delivered, 
it has not resulted in recognizable improvements in key health indicators such as maternal and 
child health.  Instead, health experts must work to bridge the divide between vertical approaches 
that target particular indicators and horizontal approaches that focus on the health system as a 
whole.   
Mortality rates will continue to remain high and the benefits of improving the health sector 
will go unnoticed by the Afghan people if further efforts are not made to promote the utilization 
of health services, especially among pregnant women.  Working to further incorporate at-risk 
populations such as women with children into the health sector will result in declining mortality 
rates and further work to legitimize the efforts of the central government by demonstrating its 
capacity to provide essential public services. 
Keeping in mind Afghanistan’s wide array of health crises and the need to improve its 
deficient regulatory and managerial capacity, the most sensible approach to improving the health 
system in Afghanistan should be neither exclusively vertical nor horizontal but rather a 
combination of both, with a focus on vertical efforts to educate pregnant women about the need 
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to utilize health services and promote healthy lifestyle choices relating to breastfeeding and 
nutrition.  
Currently, the number of door-to-door community health workers trained in midwifery 
techniques and maternal health is very low.  In order to address this, the Ministry of Public 
Health (MoPH) in Afghanistan should work to increase the quality of training given to traditional 
birth attendants (TBAs), work to incorporate them into the health system, and utilize their role as 
members of local communities to improve health conditions for women in rural provinces.  It is 
only through a rigorous and targeted effort to promote the utilization of health facilities during 
childbirth while simultaneously working to improve those services across the health sector that 
Afghanistan will see reductions in maternal mortality and improvements in overall health.  
1.1 CENTRAL POINTS ADDRESSED BELOW 
The first section of this paper provides a more detailed breakdown of health conditions in 
Afghanistan, works to describe key crises, and provides further information on the conditions of 
health facilities.  The second section puts the public health crisis in a historical context, detailing 
the conditions of health care delivery in the preceding forty years, the health effects of decades 
of political instability and struggle, and the systematic dismantling of health services that took 
place under the rule of the Taliban.  Many of the Taliban’s efforts to establish oppressive 
political rule focused specifically on weakening and marginalizing the role of women in society, 
an effort often cited as the reason for Afghanistan’s severe crisis in the area of women’s health.  
This section then describes current obstacles that impede the effort of improving health, such as 
the rising insurgency, the ongoing drug trade, and corruption. 
 6 
The next three sections work to detail the complex structure of delivering health services 
nationwide. The first of these sections describes the relationship between foreign aid donors and 
the central government; the second describes the relationship between the central government 
and the provincial government; and the third describes the relationship between the central 
government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working to deliver health services.  
The sixth section details how the delivery of services works at the provincial level and explains 
the different types of health facilities and the services they offer.  The seventh section describes 
efforts to improve the accessibility of these services by providing as many services as possible at 
the local level.   
On a national level, the central government has worked to improve health services in 
Afghanistan, standardize measures of care, and expand the geographical scope of services.  
These efforts comprise the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), a staple of the Afghan 
government’s health policy and the sector-wide strategy to improve services, which is addressed 
in a later section of this paper.   
In order to assess the improvements in efforts to expand access to and quality of health 
services, the government worked with outside contractors to develop the Balanced Scorecard 
(BSC), an indicator that measures year-to-year improvements in health objectives.  The BSC is a 
vital tool for assessing sector-wide improvements in health services, and is discussed in greater 
detail later on.  Sample BSCs are included at the end of this paper. 
Though the BPHS is a horizontal effort to improve services across the entire health sector, it 
relies heavily on vertical campaigns in the short-term.  The MoPH has announced its intention of 
fully incorporating these campaigns into the sector-wide BPHS.  These vertical programs are 
discussed in a section below.  Despite the success of vertical campaigns and of horizontal efforts 
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to improve the health sector, both approaches include certain limitations that weaken their ability 
to address the broader issue of health.  These limitations are discussed in a later section, which 
further provides evidence for the need of a more comprehensive approach to improving the 
delivery of services. 
Finally, the paper describes efforts to further train and utilize TBAs in outreach campaigns 
intended to educate pregnant women on the importance of health services and healthy lifestyle 
practices.  This section also reviews the effectiveness of TBAs in improving maternal health and 
emphasizes the need to further incorporate TBAs and outreach efforts into the health system to 
ensure a more comprehensive approach to improving health. 
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2.0  THE PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN 
Health conditions in Afghanistan are among some of the worst in the world, with some of the 
lowest human development indicators and the most abhorrent hospital conditions imaginable. 
Though there has been considerable progress in the past decade to improve conditions for the 
delivery of health services, life in Afghanistan remains a daily struggle and many essential 
services remain in short supply.  In 2002, the average adult life expectancy was 46 years and one 
child in four died before the age of five.8  Only eight percent of women received prenatal care 
and over 50 percent of children were chronically malnourished.9   
The prime causes of Afghanistan’s staggering under-five mortality rate (U5MR) are treatable 
diseases and conditions with a degree of severity seldom seen in the modern developed world.  
Pneumonia accounts for 25 percent of childhood deaths; diarrhea accounts for 19 percent.10  
When diarrhea during the neonatal period of childhood is included, that number is even higher – 
neonatal causes of death including diarrhea in newborn children account for 26 percent of 
Afghanistan’s mortality rate for children under five.  Malaria, measles, and daily malnutrition 
contribute to Afghanistan’s high childhood mortality rates as well, and debilitating diseases like 
polio impact the lives of many Afghan children today.   
                                                
8 Richards, Tessa et al. “Afghanistan needs security to rebuild its health services,” p. 318  
9 Sharp, Trueman W. and Burkle Jr., Frederick M. and Vaughn, Andrew F. et al. “Challenges and opportunities for 
humanitarian relief in Afghanistan.” Clinical Infectious Diseases, Vol. 34, Supplement 5. 2002, p. S218 
10 World Health Organization Mortality Country Fact Sheet 2006, Afghanistan 
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Conditions for women in Afghanistan appear to be just as 
grim, with Afghanistan claiming the second highest maternal 
mortality rate (MMR) in the world.11  While malnutrition is a 
problem in Afghanistan across the board, it is particularly cause 
for concern among pregnant women, who are often deficient in 
vital supplements such as iron and folic acid.  Women have also 
been shown to be at exceptional risk for tuberculosis (TB), a 
major contributor in adult mortality rates.12  There is little to no 
existing research on the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Afghanistan although there is reason to fear 
that an outbreak is not inconceivable in the future.  
There is also an immense mental health crisis that often goes unnoticed and untreated, with 
high rates of severe and unreported depression and suicide after decades of war and turmoil.  
One study published by the American Medical Association (AMA) found that one in five non-
disabled Afghan respondents reported having a mental illness.13  Among disabled respondents 
the number was closer to one in three.  Twenty-six percent of respondents reported experiencing 
eight or more traumatic experiences throughout their lives, with experiences ranging from lack of 
food, shelter, and water to illness and lack of medical care.  Other commonly reported traumatic 
experiences included serious injury from fighting, landmines, exposure to rocket attacks, assaults 
by members of the Taliban, torture, bombardments by Coalition forces, forced separation from 
family members, and a need to flee suddenly.   
                                                
11 “Maternal mortality rate high in Afghanistan: U.N.” Reuters India. 26 January 2009. 
12 Waldman, Ronald and Hanif, Homaira. “The public health system in Afghanistan.” Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit. 2002, p. 11 
13 Cardozo, Barbara Lopez and Bilukha, Oleg O., Crawford, Carol A. Gotway et al. “Mental health, social 
functioning and disability in postwar Afghanistan.” Journal of the American Medical Association. Vol. 292, No. 5. 
2004, p. 579 
 
1 Sierra Leone 2,100 
2 Afghanistan 1,800 
3 Niger 1,800 
4 Chad 1,500 
5 Somalia 1,400 
6 Angola 1,400 
7 Rwanda 1,300 
8 Liberia 1,200 
Source: “Maternal 
mortality in 2005.” 
WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, 
and the World Bank. 
2005, pp. 23 – 27 
Table 1: Maternal Mortality 
Rates Worldwide 
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The AMA study concluded that the prevalence of symptoms of depression, anxiety, and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) were high “even when compared with those symptoms of other 
communities traumatized by war and conflict” such as Kosovo.14  Signs and symptoms of 
depression were found to be more prevalent among women – particularly widows and mothers.  
Some researchers have suggested that inadequate maternal health care plays a considerable role 
in depression among mothers in Afghanistan, although other explanations – such as social 
conditions for women – could certainly be a significant factor.15 
While it is perhaps naïve to rank and order the wide 
array of crises in Afghanistan due to the severity and 
need for urgency inherent in each of them, it seems clear 
that maternal health is a keystone indicator that ties in to 
many of Afghanistan’s most severe health problems.  
Further efforts to increase the number of trained 
midwives, to decrease the number of pregnancies 
performed without supervision, and to train families to 
recognize warning signs during a pregnancy will help to 
reduce Afghanistan’s staggeringly high MMR and 
U5MR, reduce the number of premature births, and ensure greater child health during neonatal 
stages.  Since children born prematurely are more likely to die before the age of five and children 
who are not breastfed adequately are far more likely to be stunted or malnourished, the role of 
community health workers (CHWs) and TBAs to train new and expectant mothers how to 
                                                
14 Ibid. p. 583 
15 Dittmann, Melissa. “Rebuilding mental health in Afghanistan.” American Psychiatric Association. Vol. 35, No. 
11. 2004, p. 34 
Table 2: Health statistics for women 
Indicator # 
Female life expectancy 44 
Literate adult females as a 
% of males 
29 
Females as a % of males 
attending primary school 
60 
Females as a % of males 
attending secondary school 
33 
Contraceptive prevalence 
(%) 
10 
Antenatal coverage (%), at 
least once 
16 
Delivery care coverage (%), 
skilled attendant at birth 
14 
Delivery care coverage (%), 
institutional delivery 
13 
Maternal mortality ratio 1,800 
Source: UNICEF Afghanistan 
Statistics 
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properly look after a newborn child is extremely significant and could help lower malnutrition 
rates and child mortality rates even further.16  Women are also at a higher risk for contracting TB 
and malaria and are more vulnerable to depression, three significant crises in Afghanistan.  The 
MoPH, in a policy paper on health priorities, listed maternal and newborn mortality as the 
number one health indicator in need of improvement.17 
Afghanistan’s health crisis can be seen inside the nation’s health system as well. In 2002, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that six million people lacked or had limited 
access to medical care.18  While there has been considerable progress in reducing the number of 
people without access to health services, even the most optimistic estimates put the goal of 
nationwide access to health facilities many years in the future.19  Despite the fact that a mere 
seven percent of the population resides in Kabul, a quarter of the nation’s doctors are located in 
the capital, leaving rural regions badly understaffed.  The distribution of doctors in Afghanistan’s 
provinces is dramatically uneven, with 3.1 doctors for every 1,000 people in northern Balkh 
province and a mere 0.01 doctors for every 1,000 people in central Uruzgan province.20   
                                                
16 Waldman, Ronald et al. “The public health system in Afghanistan,” p. 10 
17 “National Health Policy 2005 – 2009 and National Health Strategy 2005 – 2006: A policy and strategy to 
accelerate implementation.” Ministry of Public Health. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2005, p. 21 
18 Richards, Tessa and Little, Ruth. “Afghanistan needs security to rebuild its health services,” p. 318 
19 “Country Cooperation Strategy for WHO and Afghanistan, 2006–2009.” World Health Organization. Regional 
Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 28 
20 Evans, Anne and Manning, Nick and Osmani, Yasin et al. “A Guide to Government in Afghanistan.” The World 
Bank and the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Washington, D.C. 2004, p. 139 
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The WHO’s Global Atlas of the 
Health Workforce estimates that in 
2005 there were 5,970 physicians and 
14,930 nurses and midwifery personnel 
in Afghanistan, with no statistic on the 
number of CHWs or TBAs.21   This 
would equate to a national average of 
0.20 physicians for every 1,000 people 
and 0.50 nurses and midwifery 
personnel for every 1,000 people.  By 
comparison, using neighboring 
countries, Pakistan has .8 physicians 
and .45 nurses and midwifery 
personnel for every 1,000 people while 
Turkmenistan has 2.64 and 4.98, 
respectively.  The WHO further reports 
that a minimum of 63,000 health workers is needed in order to provide basic essential care, 
making Afghanistan’s health system critically understaffed.22   
One survey from 2002 found 1,038 health facilities in the entire country – or one for every 
24,000 people. Another survey found that in southern Afghanistan the ratio was closer to one 
                                                
21 World Health Organization, Global Atlas of the Health Workforce, 2005 statistics, 
http://www.who.int/globalatlas/ 
22 Richards, Tessa et al. “Afghanistan needs security to rebuild its health services,” p. 318 
Table 3: Health workers per 1000 people by country  
Unless otherwise indicated, data uses 2005 statistics 
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Cambodia1 .16 .85 -- -- 
Haiti2 .25 .11 -- -- 
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Niger3 .02 .23 -- .04 
Pakistan .80 .45 .423 .123 
Rwanda .02 .45 1.483 .06 
Somalia4 .04 .11 -- .066 
Sudan4 .30 .90 .173 .59 
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1. Measured by 2000 statistics 
2. Measured by 1998 statistics 
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5. Measured by 2002 statistics 
6. Measured using 2005 statistics, other Somalia 
measurements indicated above 
Source: World Health Organization, Global Atlas 
of the Health Workforce, 
http://www.who.int/globalatlas/ 
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health facility for every 200,000 people.23  By 2009, the total number of health facilities across 
Afghanistan had increased to 1,701, although the number of health facilities province-by-
province is still very unequal, with 31 facilities in Samangan and only 12 in Uruzgan, despite 
their similar population sizes.24 25  As of 2006, 95 districts – only one third of the total number of 
districts in Afghanistan – exceeded the MoPH’s minimum goal of 1 facility for every 30,000 
people.26  Nineteen districts in Afghanistan had no health facilities whatsoever and in 22 of 
Afghanistan’s 33 provinces there were no health facilities with the capacity to perform 
emergency obstetrical care (EOC).  Only half of the nation’s health facilities have safe drinking 
water, just over a quarter have electricity, and just over a third do not have toilets for staff or 
patients.27 
2.1 THE BROADER CONTEXT OF THE HEALTH CRISIS 
The health crisis in Afghanistan did not begin in 2001 with the commencement of the 
ongoing war.  It is the result of many decades of bad governance, instability, corruption, 
terrorism, war, and crime.  Afghanistan has struggled to improve health services for many years, 
but there have been numerous obstacles that delayed or prevented these efforts from yielding 
positive results.  In order to fully understand the reasons for the health crisis and, in particular, 
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the crisis in women’s health, the topic of health must be viewed in a historical context and 
include related issues such as war, education, infrastructure, crime, and regional security. 
2.1.1 The Health System in a Historical Perspective 
Though health conditions in Afghanistan in earlier decades were, in many respects, better 
than those in the Taliban and early post-Taliban eras, Afghanistan has been dependent upon the 
international community in issues of health for many decades.  The WHO and the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) were operating in Afghanistan as early as 1957, working to 
address issues of maternal and child health, health in rural regions, and mounting campaigns 
against smallpox, malaria, and tuberculosis.28  The Ministry of Public Health and Social Affairs, 
a precursor to today’s MoPH, spent considerably on disease prevention efforts, and most of the 
vaccines used in such efforts were produced locally.29  International organizations worked 
regularly in Afghanistan and supplied the nation with physicians, nurses, medication, and 
medical equipment.  Following the ratification of the 1964 Constitution, which declared it to be 
the duty of the state to construct new health facilities, the health ministry began the construction 
of new hospitals in sixteen provinces.  
In 1973, Mohammad Daoud Khan, first cousin of King Mohammad Zahir Shah, overthrew 
the monarchy, led by his cousin, in a military-led coup with backing from Afghan communists.  
Daoud suspended the Constitution and quickly distanced himself from the communists that 
helped bring him to power, angering many of his supporters.30  The communists felt betrayed 
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and staged a 1978 military coup that toppled Daoud’s government.  A new communist regime 
was established under the leadership of Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, which 
worked to implement a wide set of economic and political changes, such as land reform, 
advancing equal rights for women, and the elimination of debts among peasantry.31  These 
reforms were not well received by most Afghans, who saw the communist regime as being at 
odds with Afghanistan’s social norms.  Furthermore, forced redistribution of land by the 
communists who sought to collectivize agriculture was a direct threat to the livelihood of most 
Afghans who lived in rural areas. 
After a series of uprisings and revolts that nearly toppled the still weak regime, the Soviet 
Union sent in troops in December of 1979 to quell the insurgency.  The result of this invasion 
was another decade marred by war, violence, and political instability.  Many of the nation’s 
doctors and health workers fled the country at this time, resulting in the largest refugee exodus in 
recorded history.32  Prior to 1978 there were an estimated 1,000 physicians in Afghanistan, with 
84 percent of them located in Kabul.  By 1985, approximately 750 successfully sought asylum in 
Europe and the United States, roughly 200 were operating out of Pakistan, and likely no more 
than 50 doctors remained in the country.33  In total, an estimated six to eight million people fled 
Afghanistan for Pakistan and Iran during the decade of Soviet occupation.34 
In the 1980s, French NGOs including Médicins sans Frontièrs established illegal medical 
facilities in Peshawar and throughout Afghanistan.  Neither the Pakistani government nor the 
ruling communist regime in Afghanistan permitted such activities, but international health 
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workers in Pakistan on tourist visas routinely smuggled medical supplies in their luggage and 
stored them in safe houses owned by sympathetic mujahideen fighters.35  Due to unrelenting air 
attacks by Soviets, many areas of Afghanistan remained unreachable for health workers, and 
operations were largely run through Peshawar with a focus on refugees. Workers continued to 
supply services for Afghan refugees in Pakistan’s Northwestern Frontier Province (NWFP) and 
some NGOs such as the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan worked to provide some basic 
services inside Afghanistan, though these services were mostly limited to the peripheral 
provinces near the Pakistan border.36 
By 1985, mujahideen fighters resisting the Soviet invasion occupied 90 percent of 
Afghanistan, but these areas were still not safe from attacks: ongoing air raids by Soviet planes 
and helicopters kept the country in a constant state of unrest.37  Health workers operating out of 
mobile health facilities risked life and limb on a daily basis: one in seven health workers died as 
a result of military actions in 1985.38  It was further estimated that a mere 3 percent of Afghans 
living in mujahideen-controlled regions had access to health services at this time, and many 
regions had no health facilities at all.39  The few health facilities that did operate regularly in 
Afghanistan had little ability to handle surgical care, and patients needing complex procedures 
had no choice but to seek services in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.  In total, between Afghan 
organizations and international NGOs, estimates put the number of trained medical personnel 
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operating in Afghanistan in 1985 at fewer than 2,000.40  Of these workers, over three quarters 
were trained in little more than first aid.   
Seeking to repair Afghanistan’s fractured health system and provide treatment to those in 
need, seven political parties worked together to form a coalition that became known as the 
Alliance Health Committee (AHC).41  NGOs operating out of Pakistan formed a coalition of 
their own in 1986, known as the Coordination of Medical Committees (CMC).   Despite 
significant personal differences between the two agencies, the CMC and the AHC worked 
together to provide medical care for wounded soldiers, the civilian population, and to improve 
their operating capacity across the war-torn provinces.  The AHC, which provided salaries to 
medical workers operating in Afghanistan, trained health workers over the next year and 
deployed them across the country in most of Afghanistan’s provinces.   
After the Soviets announced their intention to withdraw their forces in 1988, rival political 
forces in Afghanistan struggled to take control.  The existing communist regime struggled to 
remain in power until 1992 but, without the continued assistance from the Soviets, it soon 
collapsed, leaving Kabul to the mujahideen government and a civil war.42  Those who expected 
stability to come along with the transition of authority were quickly disappointed.  Regional 
militias struggled for power, warlords occupied rural provinces and extorted taxes from 
residents, and fighters actively participated in drug smuggling and arms trafficking.  Throughout 
much of the war-torn country there was no indication that anybody had power and the authority 
of the state ceased to exist.  This situation lasted until the mid-1990s. 
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In November of 1994, a group of rural Afghan Pashtun youths, who received their religious 
education in Pakistan rose to prominence as a military and political force in Afghanistan and 
quickly gained political control of the country.  This group, known as the Taliban, recruited its 
members mostly from refugee camps and religious madrassas.43  The Taliban as a movement 
promised good governance and freedom from corruption.  Nearly two years later, in September 
1996, the Taliban had taken control of Kabul and begun to declare a series of laws and edicts 
restricting the rights of Afghan citizens, especially women.  Women were no longer permitted to 
work outside the home, receive schooling, or be seen in public without the accompaniment of a 
male escort and without being covered from head to toe in a burqa, a body-length garment with a 
small screen from which to see, breathe, and speak.44  Women without husbands or living fathers 
were often left helpless in this environment, and older widows in particular suffered severely. 
Health facilities were segregated by gender, and women were left with only one hospital in 
all of Kabul, which was ill-equipped, understaffed, and lacking basic drugs and medical 
services.45  Female medical workers were prohibited from working in any other hospitals, and 
nurses often reported being beaten by Taliban guards who were stationed at many health 
facilities throughout the city.  After an immense international uproar, the ICRC worked to 
pressure the Taliban into lifting its restrictions on segregated health facilities, which it eventually 
did, though it left other restrictions on the conduct of women intact.  Male doctors were 
prohibited from treating women entirely and were forbidden from treating children located in 
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female wards of hospitals.  Due to the severe shortage of female doctors, this often meant death 
for children hospitalized with ill mothers.46   
When the non-profit organization Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) visited the Rabia 
Balkhi Hospital in Kabul – once the only hospital that treated women – they found deplorable 
conditions.  Many women had not received medical attention at all and some women reported 
that they had not been attended to for ten days.47  In a report on conditions for women in 
Afghanistan, PHR wrote that, to the best of their knowledge: 
No other regime in the world has methodically and violently forced half of its 
population into virtual house arrest, prohibiting them … from showing their 
faces, seeking medical care without an escort, or attending school.48   
 
PHR researchers in Afghanistan conducted a series of studies on women’s health and found a 
shocking result: 53 percent of women reported being at one point seriously ill but unable to seek 
medical care due to Taliban policies.49  Some of the most common reasons for their inability to 
access medical services ranged from the inability to find a chaperone, restrictions to their 
mobility due to Taliban law, a lack of female physicians in hospitals, health facilities refusing to 
treat them, and an inability to afford treatment.50  PHR also found that Taliban policies had 
crippling effects on women’s mental health: 81 percent of respondents reported a “decline in 
mental condition,” and found that cases of major depression, PTSD, anxiety, and frequent 
suicidal thoughts were extremely common.51 
No reliable records exist during this time that would indicate the prevalence of maternal 
deaths, but it is widely assumed that the levels were extremely high.  Statistics during this era 
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were lacking all around: a nationwide census had not been conducted since 1979, and this effort 
was never completed due to the exodus of refugees after the Soviet invasion.52  To date, a census 
for Afghanistan has not been completed since the 1970s.  This has been a significant hindrance 
to aid efforts, since international organizations have to rely on data that is less reliable to 
estimate the size of regional populations.   
In 1997, UNICEF began implementing health programs in four provinces aimed at 
improving maternal health and strengthening EOC services.  These efforts were based on the 
objectives of the Safe Motherhood Initiative (SMI), a global effort to improve maternal health 
that will be detailed later in this paper.  Three years later, a consultant hired by UNICEF assessed 
the efforts and noted that the program was “still very much in its infancy” and that deplorable 
conditions in health facilities were still prevalent.53  
On 11 September 2001, the terrorist group al-Qaeda, operating out of Afghanistan with close 
ties to the Taliban, launched a series of coordinated terrorist attacks against the United States, 
killing nearly 3,000 people in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Shanksville, Pennsylvania.  
The United States and its allies declared war on the Taliban in Afghanistan and, on 7 October 
2001, began launching targeted strikes and air raids.54  By 13 November 2001, the Taliban had 
fled Kabul and the city quickly fell to coalition and Afghan forces.  The coalition of troops 
fighting in Afghanistan included every member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and other allied forces from around the world, collectively known as the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  Since 2001, the U.S., Afghan, and coalition partners have 
fought against a resurgent Taliban. 
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2.1.2 Reconstruction and Development in a Fragile Environment 
Security conditions in Afghanistan remain a major cause for concern and play a significant 
role in weakening the availability of health care, especially in remote and rural areas.  Among the 
major security concerns are issues relating to terrorism, the resurgence of the Taliban, corruption, 
and the cultivation of poppy seeds.  Despite the continued presence of hundreds of thousands of 
international troops, security remains a pressing issue and many Afghans in rural provinces do 
not feel as if the international community is doing enough to address the issue.  According to 
recent surveys, Afghans reported feeling that lack of security was the most pressing issue facing 
their country.55  But boosting security forces cannot be seen as a project exclusively reserved for 
international forces.   
In 2008, the Afghan National Army (ANA) included 80,000 troops, while the Afghan 
National Police (ANP) had even fewer, with only 70,000 officers.56  This made Afghanistan 
home to one of the lowest soldier-to-inhabitant ratios in a post-conflict setting.  However, the 
past two years have seen a significant increase in the number of ANA troops, with their numbers 
climbing to 94,000 near the end of 2009.57 NATO, which has been training ANA troops and 
ANP officers, aims to hand over control of security to Afghan forces by the year 2014.58 
The security shortage in Afghanistan has raised doubts about the country’s ability to fend off 
a resurging Taliban presence.  There has been a considerable reorganizing of Taliban forces in 
recent years, and areas such as Kandahar and Helmand have remained Taliban strongholds.  Seth 
Jones, a policy expert at the RAND Corporation, emphasized the need for a stronger presence of 
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government and security forces in rural areas in order to effectively deter the rising insurgent 
presence.  Lack of governance in rural provinces was one of the major reasons for the initial rise 
in Taliban insurgency, according to the Afghan intelligence agency National Directorate of 
Security.59  In Helmand province, an area that was heavily dominated by Taliban forces before 
the recent troop surge, government presence was said to be virtually non-existent.  “Given 
sustained security and assistance,” Jones wrote, “villages across this swath of territory might 
have sided with the government” but, due in large part to low levels of troops and government 
officials, villagers have shown more support for insurgents.60   
To combat the Taliban insurgency, NATO troops have recently launched major offensives in 
these areas and are working to secure regions previously still under the Taliban reign.  Military 
offensives in Kandahar and the Helmand region of Marja are two essential components of the 
recent troop surge intended to counter the rising insurgency.  Of the 30,000 new US troops 
deployed to Afghanistan in 2009, roughly 9,000 are being deployed to Helmand province.  
21,000 new troops from the US and other NATO allies are being sent to Kandahar, and an 
additional 4,000 troops will be spread throughout the country to assist in efforts to train the ANA 
and the ANP.61  The offensives in these regions have led to an increase in violence, but military 
experts remain confident that the counter-insurgency efforts will work to improve security within 
the coming months.   
The insurgency has also resulted in a sharp rise in suicide bombings.  The number of suicide 
bombings recorded in Afghanistan has increased dramatically over the years, from only one in 
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2002 to 140 in 2007.62  A report released by the UN in mid 2010 estimated that Afghanistan 
currently experiences an average of three suicide bombings per week.63  Attacks using 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have also seen a sharp increase.  In 2003, there were 83 
reports of IEDs either exploding or being successfully disarmed.  By 2009, that number had 
increased to 7,000.64  In the month of January 2010 alone there were 1,000 reports of IEDs being 
used in Afghanistan.65  NATO troops and the Afghan government have been working to address 
the rise in IED attacks through several strategies: increasing the training of ANA troops in the 
dismantling of explosives, working to foster collaboration with locals knowledgeable of bomb-
making efforts in their areas, and banning the possession or sale of ammonium nitrate, a major 
component in the manufacturing of IEDs.66 
The close relationship between the insurgency and poppy seed cultivation greatly 
complicates efforts towards improving regional security.  Afghanistan is practically the world’s 
sole supplier of opium, with 90 percent of the world’s opium coming from poppy seeds 
cultivated in Afghanistan. Cultivation is a major component of the underground economy in 
Afghanistan, which makes up roughly a third of the nation’s GDP.  One recent opinion poll in 
Afghanistan found that drug traffickers were viewed as one of the biggest threats to security, 
second only to the Taliban.67  Poppy seeds are the primary source of money for the Taliban, and 
the primary financial cause of the ongoing insurgency. 
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The past few years have shown some improvement in efforts to reduce poppy seed 
cultivation, which is now mostly limited to the southern and western provinces of Afghanistan.  
USAID estimated in 2009 that 20 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces were free of poppy 
cultivation.68 2008 saw a 19 percent reduction in poppy cultivation, and 18 provinces were 
declared poppy-free.69   There were only 13 poppy-free provinces in 2007, and the number was 
lower still in 2006, with only six of the 34 provinces being declared poppy-free.70   
Many assessments have found that poppy seed cultivation has been nearly eliminated entirely 
in the northern and eastern provinces.  Studies have also found that, while opium-free provinces 
tend to be among the poorest in the country, they are also some of the safest.  Helmand province, 
which produces two-thirds of the nation’s poppy, is considered to be one of the least safe 
provinces and has a strong Taliban presence.71  An estimated 93 percent of Helmand’s 
population participates in the narco-economy, and police forces frequently levy taxes on poppy 
revenues rather than prevent the practice.  But even in Helmand, once referred to as the “bread 
basket” of Afghanistan due to the considerable profits yielded from poppy cultivation, counter-
narcotic efforts are showing signs of progress.  Land used to cultivate poppy seeds in Helmand 
declined by a third in 2009, and officials in Helmand were aiming to further reduce cultivation 
by fifty percent this year.72 
For many Afghans, poppy cultivation is a necessity, since it employs so many people and is 
such a major contributor to the nation’s economy.  In the initial effort to boost counter-narcotic 
efforts in Afghanistan, US officials advocated spraying chemicals from airplanes on poppy fields 
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to kill crops.  This effort was met with resistance from the Karzai administration, which feared 
that the use of air raids would result in a backlash of opposition from farmers in rural regions and 
would risk empowering the Taliban further.73  Opinion polls conducted in Afghanistan found an 
overwhelming 91 percent of Afghans supported the eradication of poppy fields, but only 13 
percent supported doing so through the spraying of chemicals.74   
Recently, US officials have backtracked on their support for chemical spraying, 
acknowledging that such efforts are potentially counterproductive and not cost-effective.75  
While officials remain committed to reducing the dependence of farmers on the cultivation of 
poppy, efforts have expanded to include campaigns to promote the cultivation of alternative 
crops.  USAID has been working to provide loans to farmers that grow pomegranates, grapes, 
and apricots and provides the materials and tools necessary to produce high-value crops.76 
Saffron, a crop in high demand with a wide array of uses, has become a common source of 
revenue for farmers in the northwest, and may help reduce the nation’s agricultural dependence 
on poppy.77  The economic advantage of poppy cultivation has also seen a marked decline.  A 
few years ago, a hectacre of poppy seeds in Afghanistan produced 27 times the profits of 
wheat.78  In 2009, the gap in profits decreased to a ratio of one to three.  
Another major issue that restricts reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan is the rampant 
corruption.  The problem is so endemic that the 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, run by the 
NGO Transparency International, ranked Afghanistan the second most corrupt country in the 
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world.79  Services provided by the public sector are widely seen as the most corrupt, which 
serves as a major financial obstacle to people living in poverty.  One poll from 2009 found that 
63 percent of respondents felt that corruption among local government officials and police was a 
major problem in their area, and 71 percent felt that corruption had either increased or remained 
the same in the past year.80  Another survey found that bribery was common in all major public 
services, including in dealings with the judiciary, the ANP, municipality officials, and healthcare 
services.81  Some of the findings of this survey can be found in Chart 1 below, which breaks 
down the prevalence of bribes by the nature of contact with government officials. 
The number of respondents who reported never having to pay bribes for healthcare services 
is higher than for any other government service except in dealings with the Afghan army.  At the 
same time, however, the total number of respondents who reported having to pay bribes for 
healthcare services in all cases, most cases, or in isolated cases combined was higher than for any 
other government service across the board.  The reason for this discrepancy was because the 
study showed that fewer respondents reported not having had contact with healthcare services 
than with any other service. 
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Figure 1: Corruption among government officials 
 “Whenever you have contacted government officials, how often in the past year have you 
had to give cash, a gift or perform a favor for an official? If you had contacts with such 
officials in the past year, was it in all cases, most of the cases, in isolated or in no cases?” 
 
Source: “Afghanistan in 2009: A survey of the Afghan people.” The Asia Foundation. 2009, 
p. 185 
 
Another study from 2010 noted that the most expensive bribes are paid for services such as 
education and health, with average bribes for health services amounting to $143 per household.82  
Though bribes for health services may not the most common form of corruption, this amounts to 
a considerable portion of a family’s budget, considering the average Afghan household of 7.3 
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family members makes an average income of $3,665 per year.  This makes the issue of 
corruption a considerable obstacle in efforts to expand services and boost the utilization of health 
facilities.  Overall, however, the same study found that the MoPH was perceived as one of the 
least corrupt public institutions as Chart 2 demonstrates.   
Figure 2: Public institutions perceived to be the most corrupt 
 
Source: “Afghan perceptions of corruption: A national survey 2010.” 
Integrity Watch Afghanistan. 2010, p. 30 
 
While there may appear to be signs of progress in efforts to improve security and quell the 
illegal drug trade in Afghanistan, the endemic nature of corruption in public services remains a 
significant impediment to efforts to improve the daily lives of the Afghan people.  Bribery and 
corruption by public officials stem from the low wages of public sector employees, lack of 
accountability, ineffective law enforcement, and widespread poverty.83  In order to fully see 
demonstrable improvements in the living conditions of the Afghan people, the central 
government must commit itself to the cause of reducing corruption in public services and 
strengthening the supervisory authority of the nation’s anti-corruption agency, the High Office of 
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Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HoO).  The agency, established in 2008 at the behest of 
President Karzai, is the nation’s “highest office for the … implementation of administrative 
procedural reform.”84   
One major component of the HoO is the Department of Asset Registration, which monitors 
the income of public officials.  Currently, asset declarations must be made upon being hired for 
the public service, once per year, prior to the last day of employment, and upon court order.85  
Though the process of expanding asset monitoring is being phased in over time, the only officials 
required to declare assets during the initial phase are the president, the vice presidents, cabinet 
ministers, and the heads of state institutions such as the attorney general and the chief justice.86   
By the fall of 2010 this will have expanded to include deputy ministers, members of Parliament, 
and governors.  However, mayors, district administrators, high-ranking officials, and employees 
of financial departments will not be required to declare assets until late 2011.  The HoO must 
work to expand the assets registration program and ensure that public officials working in 
agencies reputed to engage in routine bribery are subjected to regular examinations of income.87 
The central government must also work to ensure that the procedures of obtaining public 
services, such as medical treatment, are displayed publicly in facilities to ensure that people have 
access to necessary information.  If not, the issue of corruption will continue to be a considerable 
obstacle in efforts to expand the utilization of health services. 
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3.0  UNDERSTANDING THE HEALTH SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN 
The collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001 left the already unstable nation of Afghanistan in 
an extremely fragile state with failing infrastructure and a public health system that was ill-
equipped and overburdened.  Roads and bridges in Afghanistan were nothing more than rubble 
after decades of war and neglect, rendering access to medical care nearly impossible for many 
families.  After the establishment of a governing Interim Authority in late 2001, a major effort 
ensued to revitalize the public health system, improve quality of care, and to extend outreach to 
rural communities.  In order to effectively tackle Afghanistan’s immense health crisis, the World 
Bank, the WHO, and Afghanistan’s central government worked to standardize health objectives 
on a national level and define the scope and limitations of the MoPH.   
While these efforts were still coming into fruition, a 2002 report from the Afghanistan 
Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) described Afghanistan’s then-current health system as 
being in a “state of near-total disrepair” and provided recommendations of content and 
management in future efforts to reform health services in the country.88  Among those 
recommendations were the need to improve consistency in health goals and objectives among all 
actors in the health system, the need to address health crises such as pneumonia, malaria, and 
malnutrition, and the significance of community-level health services in primary care treatment.   
                                                
88 Waldman, Ronald et al. “The public health system in Afghanistan,” p. i 
 31 
The Joint Donor Mission (JDM), led in early 2002 by the World Bank and the WHO, 
advocated expanding the geographical scope of health services to improve access in remote areas 
of the country, a systemic indicator that would allow for adequate monitoring of improvement in 
health objectives, and a standardized set of health services that would form the backbone of the 
country’s health policy.89  That same year, the MoPH announced the development of the Basic 
Package of Health Services (BPHS), which worked to standardize health care policies on a 
national level, expand coverage in underserved regions, and vowed to address major health crises 
such as maternal and newborn health, immunization, nutrition, and mental health.90  The BPHS 
was not intended to be a panacea for the war-torn nation’s health crisis; the overall objective was 
to address “only those health problems for which safe and effective interventions are currently 
available,” the AREU wrote.91  The details and the success of the BPHS will be discussed in a 
later section. 
In an effort to reduce cost and relieve some of the pressure from the new and incipient 
government, donor proposals for a reformed health system written in the early post-Taliban era 
limited the role of the central government to being more of a regulator and a steward of health 
care provided by the private sector rather than a provider itself.  The result, some have said, is 
the establishment of a health ministry that “no longer does things, but concentrates on making 
sure that things get done.”92  While such an approach has had many critics who argued that 
assuming a government to be ineffectual would hinder its capacity to gain legitimacy at the 
community level, the government itself supported such a strategy, acknowledging its inability to 
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singlehandedly tackle the immense public health crisis in Afghanistan in a timely and effective 
fashion.93 There was a general consensus that the MoPH lacked the capacity to deliver health 
services in all levels of care on a nationwide basis, a concern that was no doubt justified 
considering the demonstrable instability and weak public sector in Afghanistan. As a result, the 
current health system is a complex mixture of the public and private sectors, for-profit and not-
for-profit organizations, international agencies and local involvement.   
The Minister of Public Health is appointed by the President and confirmed by both houses of 
the Afghan Parliament.94  Currently, the acting Minister is Dr. Suraya Dalil, appointed to the 
position without parliamentary confirmation in 2010 after the parliament rejected most of 
Karzai’s cabinet.95 96  The Minister runs the High Council, the highest decision-making body 
within the MoPH, and has the final say in policy issues.97  Aside from the Minister, the High 
Council includes the three deputy ministers.  At a lower level, the High Council meets weekly in 
collaboration with the Executive Board, which consists of the Minister and her deputies, 
advisers, general directors, and key program managers.  Overall, the MoPH consists of 1,400 
health experts and support staff, who work in Kabul and other provinces.   
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3.1 RELATION BETWEEN FOREIGN AID DONORS AND THE CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 
The largest international contributors to the public health system in Afghanistan are agencies 
such as the World Bank, the EC, and USAID.  United Nations (UN) agencies such as UNICEF, 
the WHO, and the World Food Program provide medical assistance alongside local and 
international NGOs such as the ICRC and Médicins sans Frontièrs.98  External aid accounts for 
over 70 percent of health system funding.99  In 2002, the MoPH’s operational budget detailed 
sources of health financing, with an estimated $126 million – 78 percent of overall revenue for 
health financing – coming from donors, UN agencies, and non-local NGOs.  A further $18 
million – 11 percent – came from government expenditures, and another $17 million was 
generated through user fees generated from private sector treatment.100  
 Although UN agencies play a pivotal role in providing treatment to those in need, they have 
not been particularly active in setting the agenda for health policy in Afghanistan.101  The biggest 
actor in defining health policy in Afghanistan has been the World Bank, which proposed the 
general framework for the health system in place in Afghanistan today.102  On the provincial 
level, the World Bank funds medical care for eight provinces in collaboration with NGOs and 
three provinces in collaboration with the MoPH’s Strengthening Mechanism, which will be 
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detailed in a later section.  USAID covers 13 provinces – seven of them in collaboration with the 
World Bank – and the EC covers ten.103   
Table 4: Breakdown of donor contracts in Afghanistan 
 Districts Population Contracts’ 
costs 
NGOs 
contracted 
International 
NGOs 
USAID 134 7,034,910 $58,419,407 19 10 
World Bank 90 4,689,300 $47,653,014 6 4 
EC 80 3,994,200 $32,702,179 9 6 
ADB 11 294,500 $2,868,006 3 2 
Others 8 273,800 - 2 2 
Total 323 16,286,710 $141,642,607 39 24 
Source: Health Systems Profile: Afghanistan. Regional Health Systems 
Observatory. World Health Organization. 2006, Annex II 
Figure 3: Population covered by donors 
 
Source: Health Systems Profile: Afghanistan. Regional Health Systems 
Observatory. World Health Organization. 2006, Annex II 
 
 
The estimated total expenditure per capita on health in Afghanistan has increased 
dramatically in the past decade from $3 in 2001 to $11 in 2002 to $29 in 2008.104  At the same 
time, however, out of pocket expenditures on health as a percentage of private expenditure on 
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health decreased dramatically as well, making up 97.3 percent of private expenditure costs in 
2001 and only 60.2 percent in 2008.  Data detailing health expenditures can be found in Table 5 
below.   
Despite the fact that funding for the health system has always been lacking, some experts 
believe that reductions in funding are likely in the near future.105  As the central government 
increases its ability to collect tax revenue across the provinces, more of this money can be pooled 
towards ministries with a stronger financial need – such as the MoPH – but it is likely that 
additional tax revenue will not add to the health budget but rather replace and subsequently 
reduce international and external funding.106 Projected tax revenue data for Afghanistan for 
recent and upcoming years can be found in Table 6 below. 
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Table 5: Health expenditure data for Afghanistan, 1999 – 2008 
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Per capita total expenditure on 
health at an average exchange 
rate (US$) 
4 3 3 11 11 14 - - 20 29 
Per capita govt. expenditure on 
health at an average exchange 
rate (US$) 
1 1 1 4 4 2 - - 3.9 10 
Total expenditure on health as a 
% of GDP 
3.2 2.8 3.2 6.7 6.5 4.4 - - 5.2 8.1 
General govt. expenditure on 
health as a % of total expenditure 
on health 
1.5 1.5 1.9 - 39.5 16.9 - - 20 33.2 
Private expenditure on health as a 
% of total expenditure on health 
98.5 98.5 98.1 58.9 60.5 - - - - - 
General govt. expenditure on 
health as a % of total govt. 
expenditure 
1.6 1.6 1.6 7.4 7.3 2.3 - - 3.3 5.5 
Out of pocket expenditure on 
health as a % of private 
expenditure on health  
98.2 98 97.3 75.9 76.5 - - - - 60.2 
Source: East Mediterranean Regional Health System Observatory. Country 
Information: Afghanistan. Country Data. World Health Organization.  
Table 6: Tax revenue projections for Afghanistan 
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GDP average 
annual growth rate 
(%) 
15% 12% 10% 9% 8% 8% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
GDP annual total 
($ million) 
5,000 5,750 6,440 7,084 7,722 8,339 9,006 9,637 10,311 11,033 
Population annual 
growth rate (%) 
3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 
Population (million) 25 25.9 26.8 27.7 28.7 29.7 30.7 31.8 32.9 34.1 
Per capita GDP ($) 200 222 240 256 269 281 293 303 313 324 
Tax Revenue as % 
of GDP 
0% 0% 4% 4% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Tax Revenue - - 258 283 772 834 901 964 1031 1103 
Health share of Gvt 
Budget 
7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
Projected 
additional Health 
exp. ($million) 
- - 18 20 54 58 63 67 72 77 
Projected 
additional Health 
exp. ($ p.c.) 
- - 0.7 0.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 
Source: Health Systems Profile: Afghanistan. Regional Health Systems Observatory. 
World Health Organization. 2006, p. 26 
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3.2 RELATION BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS 
In the early years after the establishment of the Interim Government and even after the 
ratification of the Constitution in 2004, Afghan President Hamid Karzai was frequently mocked 
for his inability to establish authority nationwide, with critics referring to him as the “mayor of 
Kabul.”107  In reality, however, the structure of governance in Afghanistan makes it, “in theory, 
fiscally and administratively one of the most centralized countries in the world.”108  A 
considerable degree of power and authority is granted to the president, who appoints the 
governors of provinces and districts, the mayors of cities, and the directors of independent 
offices without subject to confirmation by parliament.  The appointment of ministers to the 
presidential cabinet does require the approval of the parliament, but even this process is tainted 
by the fact that the president is also responsible for appointing one third of the parliament’s 
upper house, despite its status as an independent branch of government.109   
The government was designed from the very beginning with the intention of being strongly 
centralized, since Coalition forces in Afghanistan feared that a weak central government with 
little authority would be unable to keep the country from falling back into conflict.  But policy 
experts have since begun to see this as one of the biggest flaws in the structure of Afghan 
governance, and have advocated for further decentralization.  Decentralization as a strategy to 
improve governance in Afghanistan has been a cause advanced by the United States, and the 
central government has proposed a plan to improve sub-national governance and provide 
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budgetary authority to provincial councils.110  Whether the relatively recent goal of 
decentralization will be implemented in the near future or remain a proposal is currently unclear, 
but it appears likely that the topic will continue to gain attention in the coming years. 
One exception to the strongly centralized nature of Afghan governance is Herat province, 
which has largely remained outside the authority of Kabul.  In many respects, Herat province has 
been a success story in efforts to improve health services in fragile parts of the world.  With 84 
working health facilities in 2009, Herat is home to the fourth largest number of health facilities 
per province throughout Afghanistan.111  The WHO estimates that Herat possesses the third 
lowest U5MR and the second lowest MMR in the country.112  Herat has one doctor for every 
5,713 people, as compared to one for every 
14,967 in Afghanistan as a whole, and more 
facilities offer maternal and child than most 
other provinces.113  There is also a 
considerable number of NGOs working in the 
health sector in Herat, which is likely a result 
of the province’s relative peace and security.  
In education, Herat ranks second highest for 
the number of children enrolled in primary 
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Table 7: Under-five mortality rankings by 
province, lowest to highest 
1 Kabul 155 
2 Wardak 180 
3 Herat 180 
4 Nangarhar 180 
5 Logar 190 
6 Lagman 190 
   
27 Nuristan 270 
28 Bamyan 270 
29 Kunduz 270 
30 Badghis 300 
31 Uruzgan / Daikunde* 300 
32 Baghlan 300 
Source: World Health Organization, 
“Best Estimates” Provincial Fact 
Sheets 
*NOTE: Data was collected before Uruzgan and 
Daikunde were two separate provinces 
 39 
schools and third for the number of girls enrolled.  
Much of this, it can be said, is the result of Ismail Khan, former governor of the Herat 
province.  Khan, a former mujahideen commander, rose to power during the Soviet invasion as 
an officer in the national army.114  After the Soviet withdrawal, Khan claimed control of Herat 
until his arrest by the Taliban in 1995.  Khan escaped from prison in 2000 to join the Northern 
Alliance and overthrow the Taliban regime, winning him the hearts of the people of Herat.  He 
was appointed as provincial governor by Karzai after the establishment of the Interim 
Government, and remained in power until 2004.  During this time, Khan developed the 
reputation of an austere political leader, with many supporters praising his ability to control 
security conditions in the province and many critics accusing him of keeping peace through 
crackdowns on personal freedoms. Khan also has control of his own private police force, which 
enforces strict codes of daily conduct and claims the authority to punish “vices” among the 
people of Herat.115 
He was accused by the Ministry of Finance of collecting over $300 million in customs duties 
without submitting much of the revenue generated to the central government.116  By law, all non-
municipal revenue collected by provinces must be remitted to the central government and 
included in the national budget, with provinces acting merely as tax collectors.117  Instead, Khan 
reinvested this money into Herat province.  Khan largely disregarded demands from Kabul that 
he remit customs revenue and took full advantage of the military and economic power he 
wielded in Herat, declaring himself the “Emir of Western Afghanistan.”118  On occasion, he 
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refused to allow officials appointed by Karzai to work in Herat, despite the fact that he had no 
legal authority to determine such a matter.119 
But despite his authoritarian style, Khan is widely cited as a key ally in efforts to improve 
security conditions in the western province, which is considered to be one of the safest in the 
country.  Afghan troops working to improve security were not deployed to Herat until the spring 
of 2004, and prior efforts to control the province were handled by Khan’s personal army.120  
Unlike in other provinces in Afghanistan, people in Herat feel safe enough to wander the streets 
in the evening, an indication of how significantly security conditions in Herat improved under 
the hand of Khan.121   
In their efforts to reclaim parts of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, many of Khan’s 
fellow warlords engaged in atrocities and massacres as a way of establishing control.  With 
Khan, however, there is no reason to believe that he engaged in such activities.122 Khan also has 
not been linked to the profitable drug trade in Afghanistan, which has nearly been eradicated in 
his part of the country.  Instead, Khan looked after his province financially with the money he 
secureed from trade with Iran.  Upon the announcement by Karzai that Khan was being removed 
from his post as provincial governor, many Heratis rioted in the streets and several people were 
killed.  Though Khan no longer serves as governor, his removal was in some sense not a firing 
but a promotion: Khan currently serves as acting director of the Ministry of Energy and Water.123 
While the extent to which Khan’s rule improved health indicators in Herat is not entirely 
clear, it does seem likely that, despite his reputation, Khan’s reign has had some positive effects 
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on the province.  It might even be reasonable to argue that the success in Herat demonstrates how 
ineffective the standard political system in Afghanistan really is and how it suffers from a 
bureaucratic “top-down” mentality.  With this in mind, it would be imprudent for the central 
government not to explore whether there are positive benefits to further financial 
decentralization.  The central government could work to improve provincial autonomy in 
experimental provinces to see if they result in improvements in health conditions. 
3.3 RELATION BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
As mentioned earlier, the role of the MoPH in health policy is limited to one of a regulator of 
health services rather than a provider.  Instead, many of the actual providers of health care come 
from the private sector.  The private sector as outlined in the World Bank’s plan includes both 
for-profit and not-for-profit NGOs, which submit tenders, and a committee selects the recipients 
of contracts.  While NGOs are encouraged to compete with each other in the bidding process to 
ensure the lowest possible cost, all organizations are required to meet the standards defined by 
the MoPH to ensure quality of care.124  The role of NGOs in the delivery of health care in 
Afghanistan is so fundamental that one early estimate suggested that as much as 80 percent of 
health facilities operate with some degree of NGO involvement.125 
To provide further financial benefits to health workers and boost their incentive to work, 
many donors and NGOs offer additional “incentive payments” or “top-ups” in addition to their 
                                                
124 Ridde, Valéry. “Performance-based Partnership Agreements for the reconstruction of the health system in 
Afghanistan.” Development in Practice, Vol. 15, No. 1. 2005, p. 5 
125 Waldman, Ronald et al. “The public health system in Afghanistan,” p. 21 
 42 
regular government salaries.  Due 
in part to the MoPH’s limited 
budget and the wealth that NGOs 
can accumulate from international 
donors, many health workers 
receive supplemental incentive 
payments that rival government 
wages.  The Afghan Red Crescent 
Society (ARCS), for example, paid 
all staff 50 percent more than their 
government salaries.126   
One consequence is that health 
workers could begin to feel responsible to the donors rather than to the government.  
Furthermore, the use of incentive payments have resulted in a severe inconsistency of pay where 
health workers employed through one NGO may make considerably less than those employed by 
another.  Another concern is that the discrepancy in pay will result in an employment exodus 
from government facilities.127  To combat this, the MoPH worked in collaboration with some 
donors and NGOs to develop the Salary Policy Working Group, which has worked to regulate 
and standardize levels of pay for health workers.128  Among the policies put in place by the 
Working Group is one governing incentive payments, which states that “performance incentives 
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Table 8: Base salary scales for BPHS health workers 
General  
Practitioner 
$170 Based on daily 5 hrs work in a  
standard health center 
Surgeon $450 With postgrad diploma in Surgery 
Based on daily 8 hrs work incl. on-call 
Surgeon $600 With postgrad in obstetric surgery 
Based on daily 8 hrs work incl. on-call 
MD $200 Based on daily 8 hrs work incl. on-call 
Dentist $170 University-level training 
Based on 5 hrs work 
Nurse $110 18+ months of basic medical training 
Based on daily 5 hrs work 
Assistant  
Nurse 
$90 12 – 18 months basic medical training 
Based on daily 5 hrs work 
Midwife $140 Three year midwifery training 
Based on daily 5 hrs work 
Auxiliary  
Midwife 
$125 Between 1.5 and 2 yrs basic training 
Based on daily 5 hrs work 
CHW no  
salary 
To be determined by community 
Advised maximum $21 per month 
Vaccinator $80 Based on 5 hrs work per day  
(including outreach) 
TBA no  
salary 
Receives some payment for services  
rendered by clients 
Source: National Salary Policy for Non-Governmental 
Organizations Working in the Afghan Health Sector. 
Salary Policy Working Group. 2003, p. 25 
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should apply to facilities and not to individuals,” and “funds for incentives should not exceed 
10% of the payroll costs of the individual facility.”129  
Doctors are also allowed to work in the public sector while also running independent private 
practices.  It is not uncommon for a doctor to work a morning shift in a public facility and then 
work the afternoon at a privately run facility.  Though some critics fear that such a policy results 
in doctors deliberately working fewer hours than the required minimum at public facilities, 
others believe that the policy softens the demand for higher government wages and reduces 
financial stress on the MoPH, since doctors can often times earn higher wages from their private 
sector jobs.130   
In provinces receiving funding from the World Bank, the mechanism through which care is 
contracted out is called a performance-based partnership agreement (PPA).  With a PPA, an 
NGO in a particular province receives funding through a contract agreement signed with the 
World Bank designed to measure improvements in treatment.  Upon meeting the objectives of 
the contract, NGOs are eligible for a bonus worth ten percent of the value of the contract, given 
out in increments.  In provinces contracted through the World Bank, one contract is generally 
awarded for each province, and the financial value of the contract is determined on a per-capita 
basis.131  In districts contracted through other agencies such as USAID, the EC, or the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), contracts are more likely to be limited to districts or clusters of 
districts.132 
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The WHO, which has largely left policy planning to the World Bank, endorsed the PPA 
structure in a report on Afghanistan, saying that “it is not easy to see how service delivery can be 
expanded at a significant pace without contracts with NGOs” due to their prevalence in the 
health sector.133  Though academic research on this subject is fairly limited for the time being, 
many comparisons have been made between the PPA structure in Afghanistan and the 
Cambodian health care system, which offers a similar performance-based system.134  Cambodia 
was used as a model for improving health services in Afghanistan due in part to its status as a 
post-conflict society and also due to the success of such efforts there.  The PPA method in 
Afghanistan was modeled after the Cambodian system, which found that contracting out health 
services to NGOs resulted in better quality of care and higher patient satisfaction than services 
delivered by the government itself.  Furthermore, the Cambodian PPA model with NGOs 
resulted in health services that were more equitable, cost-effective, and easier to implement.135  
The World Bank and the WHO first proposed a model for Afghanistan similar to the PPA 
model in Cambodia in the JDM proposal in early 2002.136  Initially, the MoPH and NGOs in 
Afghanistan were skeptical of the proposal, since the government felt that delivering health 
services was a responsibility of the state and NGOs were used to working independently in 
Afghanistan without any state monitoring.  NGOs were further aware of how a PPA model 
would inevitably result in “winners” and “losers” in the granting of contracts, and that some 
NGOs would have natural advantages that would make them more likely to receive grants.137  
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Despite this, both the public and private sector in Afghanistan understood the need to improve 
services and how limited each would be if it acted independently.   
The MoPH and NGOs agreed to work in collaboration when drafting contracts so that NGOs 
could be aware of the terms and conditions of a PPA.138  The reasons for this were twofold.  
First, NGOs, by virtue of working at the community level for decades, had a better understanding 
of conditions in rural regions and were aware of what services were lacking in health facilities.139  
Second, experts urged that the MoPH include the NGOs in the planning stages to ensure that the 
terms and expectations of improving health services were not designed in a “top-down” fashion 
without the advice of the organizations in charge of actually delivering such services. 
Due to the disorganized nature of many local for-profit and not-for-profit actors in the 
Cambodian private sector, the initial round of contracts were given exclusively to international 
NGOs with zero local involvement.140  The result, some feared, was that the health system would 
be dependent on international assistance and fail to promote more efficient local NGOs.  
Fortunately, this has not been the case in Afghanistan.  In fact, an AREU report detailing the 
health system in Afghanistan expressed concerns that international NGOs might end up leaving 
too soon once efforts move towards health sector development rather than emergency 
response.141   
Furthermore, the report notes that as of May 2006, 27 NGOs have received contracts through 
the health system.  This included 11 national NGOs and 16 international NGOs.  While these 
numbers indicate that international NGOs have the advantage over local ones, it is not the one-
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sided exclusively international situation that was seen in Cambodia.  NGOs with the necessary 
expertise are also relatively scarce in Afghanistan, which is why international NGOs tend to be 
favored.  The report goes on to note that 52 grants had been given as of December 2006, 21 of 
which were given to national NGOs, 27 to international ones, and four to consortium 
organizations that are both national and international.  While 34 percent of funds have been 
given to national NGOs, that number reaches 51 percent if consortium organizations are included 
along with the national NGOs.  Unlike in Cambodia, the concerns of an exclusively international 
private sector in health care delivery seem unwarranted.   
The Dutch non-profit HealthNet TPO, a merger between HealthNet International (HNI) and 
Transcultural Psychological Organization (TPO), was one NGO contracted through the PPA 
model in Afghanistan.142  Prior to its merger with TPO, HNI worked in Cambodia to provide 
health services under the PPA system.143  When the PPA model was proposed in Afghanistan in 
2002, HNI pointed out a major flaw in the terms of the contracts written in Cambodia.  Payments 
for services offered in health facilities in Cambodia were determined on a per-capita basis, and 
the budget of the contract put a limit on the number of individual payments based on an 
estimated number of people that would utilize health services.  The actual increase in the number 
of patients ended up being significantly higher than expected, and HNI lost a considerable 
amount of money.  As a result, HNI urged that contracts in Afghanistan include safeguards 
intended to ensure that non-profits did not end up losing money in the contracting scheme.  
Despite this unfortunate experience, HNI agreed that the PPA system had a lot of merit and 
noted that their overall experience with PPAs in Cambodia was generally positive. 
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Performance-Based Partnership Agreements in Cambodia 
 
Cambodia, an extremely rural country highly dependent upon agriculture, is one of the poorest 
countries in South East Asia.1  Political instability, genocide, and warfare mar the history of the 
impoverished nation, leaving its average life expectancy at a low of 54.4 years.  Health care in 
the country was in a fragile state up until the 1990s, with most patients seeking self-treatment 
from informal drug sellers rather than government health facilities. One study found that 
roughly 90 percent of health care transactions took place in patients’ homes rather than at 
health clinics.2  One reason for the low demand of health facilities was the widespread distrust 
of such places, caused by long waiting lines, disrespectful staff, drug shortages, and misleading 
costs.  In 1995, Cambodia’s Ministry of Health began a major overhaul of the health system, 
which included working to rebuild infrastructure and health facilities and charging user fees to 
further fund the reform process and gain confidence in the quality of services. 
 
In 1998, Cambodia acquired a loan from the ADB, which allowed them to experiment with 
different systems of reform.  These included a contracting-out approach with private 
contractors, a contracting-in approach, and a continuation of the existing policy.3  Contracting-
out gave contractors complete control over both the staff and the budget of a health facility 
whereas contracting-in gave less control to contractors with more regulation by health 
authorities at the national and provincial levels. 
 
In districts in experimental groups, contracts broke down the payment of health workers into 
three parts: 55 percent of wages were a basic monthly incentive payment, 15 percent was 
based on punctuality and regular job attendance, and 30 percent was a performance bonus, 
dependent upon the “degree to which the monthly financial targets for the department or health 
facility were fulfilled.”4 Initially it was found that the 30 percent performance bonus was 
inadequate and failed to promote any change in behavior among health workers. 
 
By late 2000, district managers allowed health facility managers to provide their workers with 
competitive sub-contracts to further encourage performance improvements among health 
workers.  A year later, surveys by the Ministry of Health showed that experimental districts 
consistently outperformed control districts and that districts that contracted out performed 
better than districts that contracted in.5  Further studies showed that out-of-pocket health 
expenditures decreased by 40 percent in one district, despite the “substantially increased” user 
fees and a decrease in user fee exemption.6  Providing quality care at a reasonable cost, it is 
assumed, boosted demand and allowed for health care distribution to be more affordable and 
reliable across the board. 
 
1 Soeters, Robert and Griffiths, Fred. “Improving government health services through contract 
management: a case from Cambodia.” Health Policy Planning, Vol. 18, No. 1. 2003, p. 74 
2 Ibid, p. 75 
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid, p. 77 
5 Ibid, p. 78 
6 Ibid 
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3.4 HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL 
Like most other departments within the 
central government, the MoPH’s primary 
office in Kabul bears all of the 
responsibility for policy-making, 
determining structural organization, and 
staffing high-level employers throughout 
the ministry and its provincial and regional 
offices.  Medical workers of the highest 
level – grades one and two– are typically 
appointed by the President, with the central 
government’s health minister appointing 
staffers grades three through five.144  Junior 
staffers – grade six and below – are 
typically appointed by the provincial 
governor or by MoPH staff at the provincial 
level.  Provincial Health Departments 
(PHDs) hire lower level staff, transfer staff 
between health facilities, and collect basic 
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Table 9: BPHS recommended staffing, by type of 
health facility 
Health 
Facility 
Level 
Staff Categories 
 
Number 
of Staff 
Needed 
Health Post 
 Community Health Worker 1 
 Traditional Birth Attendant 1 
Basic Health Center 
 Nurse (male) 1 
 Midwife/Auxiliary Midwife 1 
 Vaccinator 2 
 Support Staff (Cleaner, Guard) 2 
Comprehensive Health Center 
 Doctor (male) 1 
 Doctor (female) 1 
 Midwife 2 
 Nurse (female) 1 
 Nurse (male) 1 
 Lab Technician 1 
 Pharmacy Technician 1 
 Vaccinator 2 
 Administrator 1 
 Support Staff (Cleaner, Guard) 4 
District Hospital 
 Doctor (male physician) 2 
 Doctor (female ob/gyn) 2 
 Surgeon 1 
 Anesthetist 1 
 Pediatrician 1 
 Nurse (female or male) 10 
 Midwife 4 
 X-ray technician 1 
 Lab Technician/BB 2 
 Pharmacist 1 
 Dentist 1 
 Dental Technician 1 
 Vaccinator 2 
 Administrator 1 
 Support Staff (Cleaner, Guard) 7 
Source: “A Basic Package of Health 
Services for Afghanistan.” Transitional 
Islamic Government of Afghanistan, 
Ministry of Health. 2003, p. 41 
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health data.  Staffers in PHDs can be 
disciplined or fired by the provincial 
health director.  The roles and 
responsibilities in health care delivery 
by level of governance can be seen 
broken down in Table 14 at the end of 
this paper. 
There are essentially three levels of 
health care provided in Afghanistan.  In 
the smaller villages, community health 
workers (CHWs) and traditional birth attendants (TBAs) provide services at designated health 
posts (HPs).  In larger villages and throughout districts there are basic health centers (BHCs), 
comprehensive health centers (CHCs), and district hospitals.  At the highest level are the 
provincial and regional hospitals, which are considerably larger.145  Different health facilities in 
Afghanistan provide different services, depending on whether the facility in question is a 
regional hospital, a provincial hospital, a district hospital, or something smaller and more 
specific.146  A structural breakdown of health facilities in Afghanistan detailing specific medical 
services offered can be found in Table 15 at the end of this paper.   
At the lowest level, CHWs and TBAs provide health services out of their homes, which are 
classified by the MoPH as HPs.147  CHWs provide curative care services including diagnosis and 
                                                
145 “Health Systems Profile: Afghanistan.” Regional Health Systems Observatory. World Health Organization. 2006, 
p. 35 
146 Evans, Anne et al. “A Guide to Government in Afghanistan,” p. 132 
147 “A Basic Package of Health Services for Afghanistan.” Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan, 
Ministry of Health. 2003, p. 7 
Table 10: BPHS-approved categories of health work 
1 General Practitioner – Doctor 
2 Medical & Nursing Specialties 
3 Dentist 
4 Dental Technician 
5 Nurse 
6 Assistance Nurse 
7 Midwife 
8 Auxiliary/Community Midwife 
9 Pharmacist 
10 Pharmacy Technician 
11 Lab Technician 
12 Assistant Lab Technician 
13 X-Ray Technician 
14 Anesthetist 
15 Physiotherapy Technician 
16 Health Inspector/Sanitarian 
17 CHW/Vaccinator 
18 TBA 
Source: “A Basic Package of Health Services for 
Afghanistan.” Transitional Islamic Government 
of Afghanistan, Ministry of Health. 2003, p. 40 
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treatment of malaria, diarrhea, and acute respiratory infections (ARI), distribution of 
contraceptives, and nutritional services.  The roles of TBAs are to be able to recognize danger 
signs during pregnancies, to provide care for standard deliveries, and to refer women to health 
centers when necessary.  The BPHS mandates that there be one HP staffed by one CHW and one 
TBA for every 1,000 to 1,500 people.148 
BHCs, stationed in larger villages and most districts, are expected to contain a nurse, a 
midwife, and vaccinators, and should provide services from antenatal care to delivery, and from 
immunization services to the distribution of essential drugs.  The BPHS further mandates that 
there be approximately one BHC for every 15,000 to 30,000 people on average.149  CHCs, which 
cover between 30,000 and 60,000 people, offer services for more complex pregnancies, severe 
childhood illnesses, and inpatient services. These facilities are staffed with doctors, nurses, 
midwives, and laboratory and pharmacy technicians.  District hospitals are expected to cover 
between 100,000 and 300,000 people and provide nearly all services available through the 
BPHS.150 
The health facilities with the widest array of health services offered operate on the regional, 
provincial, and district levels, with BHCs, CHCs, and sub-health centers providing a more 
limited list of services.  Facilities with the least amount of services offered are maternal and child 
health clinics (MHCs), expanded program of immunization clinics (EPIs), and rehabilitation 
centers.  The limited services at these facilities are obviously more of an indication of 
specialization and not a result of poor staffing or lack of equipment, though this is of course a 
problem in most health facilities in Afghanistan.  While the overlap in services provided at the 
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provincial and district level is intended to ensure that most facilities provide essential services, 
this does result in some conflict and uncertainty in assigning responsibilities and allocating funds 
to different health facilities.151    
At a typical provincial health department (PHD), the structure is often times set up without 
considerations to the staffing needs and shortages in the area, with more inter-facility 
departments than workers to staff them.  Many departments within a PHD consist of merely one 
or two people, and some are so lacking in equipment and functionality as to serve little purpose 
at all.  As mentioned in an earlier section of this paper, just over one quarter of health facilities in 
Afghanistan have electricity – a necessary functional requirement for the storing and cooling of 
blood.  Most blood banks in hospitals, therefore, are only operating when both a donor and a 
patient are simultaneously present.152  A structural setup of a typical PHD can be found in Figure 
5 at the end of this paper.  
The degree of shortages and deficiencies in a particular PHD varies depending upon the size 
and stability of a particular province, with rural provinces being more understaffed and lacking 
in basic needs such as electricity.  For this reason, it is most sensible to train health workers in 
rural provinces in a broader array of techniques to make up for staff shortages while promoting 
and advocating specialization in training in urban provinces such as Kabul province.  Though 
such an approach may leave a wide gap in urban-rural equity of care, such a gap is no doubt 
inevitable due to the severe inequality of dispersion of health workers in Afghanistan. 
In remote provinces, recruiting and retaining qualified health workers is significantly more 
challenging.  Rural hospitals are much more likely to be understaffed despite the increased 
incentives for workers in rural areas.  Previously, rural health workers were not paid more than 
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their urban counterparts, despite the fact that many staffers in rural areas felt this would strongly 
increase their ability to recruit and retain health workers in the region.153  After the establishment 
of payment standards by the Salary Policy Working Group, however, hospitals are now 
encouraged to provide “rural hardship incentives,” which use a series of tiered measurements to 
determine what percentage of a health worker’s salary will be offered as an additional bonus.154  
Such criteria include ratios such as the physician density per 10,000 population and the midwife 
density per 10,000 population as well as measurements such as the distance to the provincial 
health center or the availability of a safe water source near a worker’s place of residence.  More 
significantly, the rural hardship incentive for female health workers is double that of male health 
workers, since female health workers are so scarce in rural regions.  Female health workers, who 
are an essential element in efforts to curb Afghanistan’s high MMR, often require additional 
security and spousal employment if they are to work in rural areas, which are often more 
dangerous and socially conservative in their outlook towards women’s rights.   
Lacking from the structure of many PHDs, however, are essential outreach staff that work 
within communities, such as CHWs and TBAs.  Since most CHWs and TBAs operate their 
services out of their houses, their affiliation with provincial health facilities can be fairly limited.  
The job description of CHWs as outlined by the MoPH requires them to work “under the 
supervision” of BHC staff, but it is not clear to what extent this relationship is carried out 
consistently in districts.155  Most outreach workers in the health sector are employed and trained 
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separately by NGOs that specialize in such procedures, but lack consistency in the length and 
quality of training.156   
Considering the extremely high number of births performed without a midwife and the 
number of pregnancy-related maternal deaths, PHDs should work to streamline training and 
outreach by CHWs and TBAs.  In 2002, UNICEF assembled a team to assess the maternal health 
crisis in Afghanistan.  The team strongly urged for increased training of midwives, TBAs, and 
female physicians in order to reduce the number of births performed without the attendance of 
health workers.  In order to properly do so, the team proposed the establishment of a National 
Reproductive Health Policy in Afghanistan, with standardized guidelines for the delivery of 
reproductive health services.157  
TBAs, though often untrained and illiterate, make up a sizable portion of health workers in 
Afghanistan.  Due to their lack of literacy and medical expertise, many policy experts have 
discouraged the training of TBAs around the world in an effort to promote the use of more 
qualified midwives.  The MoPH in Afghanistan has proposed such a strategy as well, suggesting 
in 2003 that the “training of TBAs as birth attendants be discontinued” to ensure that pregnant 
women have access to skilled midwives during birth.158  The importance of effectively trained 
TBAs in efforts to improve maternal health will be discussed in a later section. 
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3.5 THE BASIC PACKAGE OF HEALTH SERVICES 
In March 2002, the MoPH, in an effort to overhaul the health system in Afghanistan, worked 
to define major health priorities, obstacles, and objectives, and defined a specified set of primary 
health care services that would be provided nationwide through health facilities.  This set of 
services, known as the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), standardized health care 
policies on a national level, expanded coverage in underserved regions, and focused on 
addressing major health crises such as maternal and newborn health, immunization, and 
nutrition.  “The concept of the Basic Package,” wrote the MoPH in its initial 2003 description of 
the role of the BPHS, “is that all of the services in the package should be available as an 
integrated whole, rather than being available piecemeal or as individual services or only through 
vertical programs.”159  In this respect, the BPHS is a horizontal approach to improving health in 
Afghanistan, working to improve the health sector as a whole.  There are seven key elements that 
make up the BPHS: maternal and newborn health, child health and immunization, nutrition, 
communicable diseases, mental health, disability, and the supply of essential drugs.160  
Prior to 2002, health facilities were still run mostly by NGOs, but they did so without 
regulation and monitoring by the MoPH.161  Donors would provide funds directly to NGOs and 
would define contractual obligations without consulting with the MoPH.  Under the new system 
put in place by the BPHS, the MoPH is closely involved in supervising and collaborating in the 
process of contracting out and delivering primary care.  In addition to the BPHS, which sets the 
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standards for the delivery of primary care in Afghanistan, the MoPH developed the Essential 
Package of Hospital Services (EPHS), which provides standards for the delivery of secondary 
and tertiary care.162  The EPHS complements the BPHS, providing standards of hospital care in 
major urban centers.163 
There are two methods of health care delivery under the BPHS: the contracting out of 
services to NGOs – the most common approach – or delivery of care provided by the MoPH 
itself under the BPHS’ Strengthening Mechanism (BPHS-SM).  The BPHS-SM allows for the 
MoPH to operate in selected safer provinces as more than just a regulator of health services.  In 
these provinces – Parwan, Panjshir, and Kapisa in particular – the MoPH is the provider of health 
services.164  The reason for this is essentially twofold: it provides the MoPH with experimental 
districts in which it can test its own effectiveness and efficiency at delivering health care services 
and it prepares the MoPH for one possible longer-term approach to health care delivery.  Since 
the MoPH cannot assume that it can rely on the assistance of international NGOs forever, it 
needs to be prepared for a scenario in which NGO involvement is reduced or phased out 
completely over time and must therefore work to strengthen its own capacity to deliver health 
care services. 
Health services provided by the MoPH are free, in compliance with the Constitution of 
Afghanistan.165  Some NGOs and international donors have required consultation charges or 
partial payment for drugs prescribed in order to recover some costs, however.166  While the 
government opposes charging patients for the cost of x-rays and laboratory tests, some provinces 
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charged user fees nonetheless to raise extra funding to combat other health emergencies in their 
area.  The MoPH put a stop to this in 2008, however, and called for a discontinuation of user fees 
all together.167  The WHO estimated in a 2006 report that user fees contributed to approximately 
one tenth of total health spending in Afghanistan.168 
The MoPH’s efforts to overhaul the health system in Afghanistan have produced some 
impressive results: in 2002 it was estimated that only nine percent of the Afghan population had 
access to health services.169  By 2005, however, that number increased to 77 percent of the 
population covered under the BPHS.170  Five percent of the population covered by the BPHS was 
being provided services directly from the MoPH under the BPHS-SM.171  The WHO noted in 
one report that the MoPH’s efforts to expand coverage is not only impressive due to the 
significant increase in the percentage of citizens covered under the BPHS, but because the effort 
has included a focus on providing care to the more “remote and far-flung areas” of 
Afghanistan.172  By the end of 2008, coverage under the BPHS had expanded further to include 
82 percent of the population.173  In a 2006 development strategy report published by the central 
government, the MoPH vowed to extend the BPHS to cover 90 percent of the population by the 
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end of 2010.174  A WHO report released the same year put the timeline for the 95 percent 
coverage goal at the end of 2015.175   
Without a doubt, the MoPH has made significant progress in expanding coverage – nearly 
tenfold in less than ten years.  One important thing to note, however, is the broad definition of 
terms such as “coverage” and “access” when the MoPH says that a percentage of the population 
lives in a district covered by the BPHS: having access to services covered under the BPHS is 
defined as living within a two hour walk from a health facility.176  In this respect, there is 
certainly still considerable room for improvement in improving the delivery of health services 
and expanding regional coverage.  At the same time, however, expanding regional coverage does 
not ensure that the quality of services offered is sufficient.  To assess the quality of services, 
some mechanism must be used to measure individual indicators and track year-by-year 
improvements.  That mechanism, the Balanced Scorecard, is discussed below.  But even 
improving the quality of services does not necessarily result in improvements in overall health, 
since communities who do not utilize health services will not experience the benefits of such 
improvements.  This problem will be discussed later on. 
3.6 MEASURING SUCCESS THROUGH THE BALANCED SCORECARD 
In order to fully measure the success of efforts to improve the delivery of health care, the 
JDM, led by the World Bank and the WHO, called for the use of a system of indicators.  This 
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would allow for the MoPH to regularly monitor progress towards achieving the predetermined 
health objectives of the BPHS, identify areas with severe deficiencies, and work to boost 
managerial capacity in health facilities.  The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) was set up to allow the 
MoPH to do precisely that, giving the Ministry the role of monitoring and measuring 
improvements in health indicators.  The BSC measures 29 indicators in order to assess the 
quality of treatment.  These indicators include such things as immunization rates, prenatal care, 
and patient satisfaction.177   
Between 2004 and 2008, Johns Hopkins University’s Bloomberg School of Public Health 
and the Indian Institute of Health Management Research worked with the MoPH to assess 
conditions in health facilities in provinces across Afghanistan.  For each of the 29 indicators, the 
BSC contains specific attainable benchmarks.  Year-to-year success is measured by the rate of 
improvement in individual indicators.178  The upper-level benchmark of any given indicator is set 
to the level that at least six provinces achieved in 2004 – the equivalent of the top twentieth 
percentile – while the lower benchmark of the indicator is set to the level achieved by the 
province above the lowest quintile in 2004.   
Data from the national-level findings can be found in Table 16 at the end of this paper.  Each 
statistic is in percentage-form and individual cells within the table are color-coded to indicate 
whether they fell above or below the upper or lower benchmarks.  Cells colored green signify 
that a specific indicator was ranked above the upper benchmark while cells colored red signify 
that a specific indicator was ranked below the lower benchmark.  Cells colored yellow signify 
that a specific indicator was ranked between the upper and the lower benchmarks.  The national-
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level findings are a combined average of each province, however, and therefore the data in Table 
16 is not able to fully capture province-by-province differences in the quality of health facilities.  
The full BSC contains similar data broken down by individual provinces with detailed analysis 
of different findings in each of the six categories: patients and community, staff results, capacity 
for service provision, service provision, financial systems, and overall vision.   
In the province of Nangarhar, for example, the percentages of facilities providing care in 
compliance with the services expected in the BPHS increased from 6.5 percent in 2004 to 71.2 
percent in 2008, marking a significant improvement in efforts to standardize care nationwide.179  
This can be found under indicator 24 on Table 17 at the end of this paper.  Nangarhar fell below 
the lowest quintile for this indicator in 2004 and 2005, but has consistently scored well above the 
upper benchmark since 2006, giving it a spot in the upper quintile for this particular indicator.  In 
all five years studied, Nangarhar reached or surpassed the upper benchmark in assessments of 
laboratory functionality, meeting minimum staff guidelines, and the number of facilities in the 
province with a register of patients with TB, as shown in indicators 9, 10, and 17 on Table 17.  
Laboratory functionality in particular has been very successful in Nangarhar, with the score for 
this indicator more than doubling by 2008 when compared to 2004.180 
On the other hand, overall patient satisfaction, assessed through observations of patient-
provider interactions and exit interviews and shown in indicator 1 on Table 17, has markedly 
declined.  Improvements in drug availability – indicator 7 on Table 17 – have been relatively 
stagnant, and facility infrastructure – indicator 15 of Table 17 – was deficient in 2005 and 2006 
but has since shown signs of improvement.   
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In the 2008 BSC, the methodology for measuring health worker knowledge was revised to 
include an assessment of the knowledge of vaccinators, resulting in two separate incomparable 
indicators for this measurement: indicators 11 and 11a on both tables.  This change was made as 
a result of input from the MoPH, donor agencies, and NGOs working to provide services under 
the BPHS.181  In addition to this change, the new mean score excludes indicators assessing the 
availability of user fee guidelines and exemptions for poor patients – indicators 25 and 26 on 
both tables – due to the efforts by the MoPH to eliminate user fees entirely.  For this reason, the 
two sample BSCs below include two mean scores: one using all 29 indicators from 2004 until 
2007 and the other using only 26 of the 29 indicators for the year 2008, though mean scores have 
since been recalculated for the previous four years to exclude these three indicators.  In 
indicators where data is unavailable due to this change in methodology, cells have been shaded 
grey and are marked as not being compatible with that particular indicator. 
  Between 2004 and 2008, the MoPH witnessed significant improvements in the ability to 
attain most benchmarks in just about every province.  In 2008, the national median score of the 
26 consistent indicators was over 70 percent, a 20 percent increase from 2004.182  Aside from 
Kabul, every province’s mean score exceeded 60 percent, and Kabul’s score was less than four 
percentage points below at 56.1 percent.183  Excluding Kabul, every province has seen an 
increase in mean score of at least ten points in the past five years, and 15 provinces have seen an 
increase in over 20 points.  22 of the 29 observed provinces experienced improvements from 
2007 to 2008.  Though the results for Kabul in 2008 were disappointing, it has performed very 
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well in previous rounds of the BSC and surpassed 62 percent of the upper benchmarks in 
2006.184 
The national median province met 57.7 percent of the upper benchmarks of each indicator in 
2008, compared to a mere 15.4 percent in 2004.185  In particular, improvements were notable in 
the availability of antenatal care, the number of new outpatients received at BHCs, the number of 
facilities with a TB register, and the ability of facilities to provide care based upon BPHS 
standards.186  Other areas that demonstrated considerable progress included the accessibility of 
essential drugs and family planning services, laboratory and equipment functionality, provider 
knowledge, and staff training.  The indicator assessing time spent with patients, which had been 
declining considerably in 2005 and 2006, saw a dramatic uptick in 2007 and increased further in 
2008.  There were, however, declines in the indicator tracking the disposal of sharp objects, 
facility infrastructure, and equity of satisfaction between the poor and non-poor, although this 
last decrease was very slight.187  Despite the gap in satisfaction between poor and non-poor 
recipients of treatment, the analysis indicates that overall patient satisfaction is generally high. 
Overall, the BSC has been a valuable tool to measure improvements in the availability of 
health services.  It has demonstrated the success in efforts to expand the BPHS and improve the 
delivery of services.  Further, it allows for provinces to be aware of the areas in which they are 
lacking and provide them with attainable goals towards which to aim.  But improvements in the 
quality of services do not equate to an improvement in the quality of overall health.  The BSC is 
not an indicator used to measure improvements in MMR, nor is a reduction in such an indicator 
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necessarily a goal.  Instead, it focuses on improving the services and facilities that can result in 
indirect reductions in MMR.   
In this sense, improvements in the availability of antenatal care and family planning services 
does not mean that maternal health will improve, since improvements will only materialize if 
there is a considerable increase in women utilizing health services and facilities for issues related 
to maternal health.  The most recent report from the United Nations Population Division 
estimated that only 18.6 percent of Afghans used contraceptives, with 8.1 percent using birth 
control pills and 5.4 percent using condoms.188  Furthermore, according to the 2003 Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) organized by UNICEF, nearly 90 percent of births are 
performed in the home rather than in health facilities, and three out of four births are attended 
only by relatives and friends rather than trained health workers.189  The MICS also found that 
only 16 percent of women receive antenatal care from a doctor or nurse.190  Most women either 
visited relatives and friends for antenatal care or did not receive any such care at all.  In this 
sense, improvements in the quality of health services for women will do little to improve overall 
health if women do not fully utilize such services.!
3.7 VERTICAL PROGRAMS AS COMPLEMENTS TO THE BASIC PACKAGE 
For the time being, some major health issues such as immunization, nutrition, and malaria, 
TB, and HIV/AIDS control are not fully integrated into BPHS, and are often handled vertically 
in collaboration with UN agencies such as UNICEF, WHO, the United Nations Population Fund 
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(UNFPA), and the Global Fund.  These agencies work to provide technical assistance in the 
delivery of these services and sometimes fund vertical programs of their own.191 Though the 
MoPH fully intends to continue its long-term goal of expanding the BPHS both in content and 
geographic coverage, the central government will “continue to strengthen the vertical programs 
and campaigns that ensure blanket coverage of simple but effective interventions such as salt 
iodination, polio, and tetanus immunization and vitamin A distribution.”192   
In the 2003 publication of the BPHS, the MoPH wrote that the ministry “recognizes that the 
massive task of rebuilding the national health system means that it may not have all the resources 
required to implement all of the BPHS elements simultaneously.”193  In particular, the MoPH 
noted, efforts to address mental health and disabilities make a “smaller contribution to reduction 
of preventable mortality in comparison with other elements of the BPHS,” and therefore have a 
status as “second-tier” services in the BPHS.194  While the reasoning behind this decision is 
perhaps sensible and the ability for the MoPH to improve services across the entire sector will no 
doubt take some time to fully phase in, the prevalence of severe depression in Afghanistan – 
especially among women – makes the issue of mental health one in urgent need of attention.  The 
MoPH has since announced its intention to integrate the aforementioned vertical programs into 
the BPHS and to work to improve services for mental health, care for the disabled, and 
HIV/AIDS prevention.195  In the summer of 2010, the MoPH began working in collaboration 
with HealthNet TPO to train health workers in mental health topics including depression, 
                                                
191 “Afghanistan: The role of contractual arrangements in improving health sector performance.” World Health 
Organization, Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 2 
192 “Health Systems Profile: Afghanistan.” World Health Organization. 2006, p. 7 
193 “A Basic Package of Health Services for Afghanistan.” Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan, 
Ministry of Health. 2003, p. 9 
194 Ibid 
195 “Afghanistan: The role of contractual arrangements in improving health sector performance.” World Health 
Organization, Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 7 
 64 
anxiety, psychosis, learning disabilities, and substance abuse disorders as a part of its effort to 
further integrate mental health services into the BPHS.196  In total, 19 doctors and 13 doctors 
received training.  These efforts are laudable and the MoPH should work to further expedite the 
incorporation of mental health services into the BPHS. 
In this sense, efforts to expand the BPHS in both scope and breadth exemplify the key 
question of improving the delivery of health care: is it more effective to rely on vertically-driven 
health programs in the short term to improve health conditions at the expense of improving the 
health sector across the board, or is it more effective to emphasize an expansion of both services 
and coverage sector-wide at the expense of targeting particular topics in health that require the 
most urgent need?  The fact that the MoPH has relied so consistently on assistance from UN 
agencies since 2002 while working to improve the delivery of health services sector-wide is an 
indication of the ministry’s perspective: both approaches have their merits and both approaches 
work well to save lives.  Rather than view vertical programs as a sound short-term solution and a 
sector-wide approach as the long-term goal, however, the MoPH should work to incorporate the 
most effective portions of each approach into a more comprehensive health strategy.  This will 
be discussed in greater detail later on. 
Without a doubt, the BPHS is a sector-wide approach to improving health care in 
Afghanistan.  A sector-wide approach has been the intention of policymakers from the start and 
continues to be the long-term objective.  In the short-term, however, the MoPH has utilized 
available resources in a practical and sensible manner by relying on assistance from UN agencies 
to launch and implement targeted vertical programs with a focus on health crises such as 
immunization and nutrition.  These efforts have produced significant improvements in 
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immunization rates and demonstrated that, despite the fact that a vertical program’s narrow focus 
can limit its ability to provide comprehensive improvements in health, such efforts have 
successfully brought health services into the homes of at-risk communities, especially pregnant 
women and children. 
3.8 IMMUNIZATION CAMPAIGNS AND VERTICAL PROGRAMS  
Efforts to eradicate measles and polio through vertical campaigns have shown considerable 
signs of success.  In 2000, prior to the collapse of the Taliban, 35 percent of target populations in 
Afghanistan were vaccinated against measles and 32 percent had received three doses of the 
polio vaccine, the amount necessary to ensure nearly 100 percent seroconversion and 
immunity.197  While that percentage is relatively low, measles and polio vaccination rates under 
the Taliban regime were boosted significantly in central Afghanistan by a targeted immunization 
campaign organized by UNICEF and the WHO from the summer of 2001 until the spring of 
2002.198   
Vaccination teams in Afghanistan operated out of mosques to establish fixed-post 
vaccination sites.  Due to the trusted role of mosques in Afghan society, vaccinators were able to 
keep people informed of the location of the vaccination post, aware of its hours of operation, and 
willing to visit the site.  No mosques refused to be used as an immunization site, allowing for 
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response teams to have a consistent strategy across the country.199  Another benefit of mosques 
as fixed-post sites was the presence of loudspeakers at most locations, which were used to inform 
residents of vaccination efforts in their community. 
Through the targeted immunization campaign in central Afghanistan, response teams 
vaccinated as many as 200 children per day, covering an estimated 77 percent of age-eligible 
children.  Two of the five central-region provinces had coverage of over 90 percent and two had 
coverage of over 80 percent.200  Coverage in Kabul was rather low – 62 percent – but it is 
believed that the population of the region was lower than estimated as a result of many families 
fleeing the city in late 2001.  Vaccination for children ages five through twelve was also lower 
than expected, but there is reason to believe that stunting could explain the discrepancy.  
“Consistent misclassification of children as younger than their true age would inflate the number 
of children aged 6 – 59 months vaccinated and decrease the number in the 5- to 12-year age 
group,” the study notes.201  
By 2008, 75 percent of targeted populations were vaccinated against measles and 85 percent 
were vaccinated against polio nationwide.202  Efforts to increase immunization percentages 
throughout Afghanistan’s 329 districts have shown success year after year, as Chart 4 below 
demonstrates.  These annual increases in immunization rates are the work of vertical campaigns 
– run by UN agencies working as a complement to the BPHS – that systematically target 
particular health crises and work to reduce their urgency. 
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Figure 4: Annual
*
 Percentages of Districts Vaccinated Against Measles, by Percentage of District's 
Population Covered
†
 
 
Source: World Health Organization, Immunization Profile – Afghanistan 
*NOTE: Statistics for 2006 are unavailable, no districts reported immunization efforts to the WHO for this year 
†NOTE: Statistics for earlier years appear to contain gaps and redundancies while statistics for later years appear 
to add up to more than 100% due to year-to-year inconsistencies in record keeping.  For the years 2004, 2005, 
and 2007, statistics are broken down into the categories of: less than 50%, 50 – 79%, 80 – 89%, !80%, and 
!90%.  For the years 2008 and 2009, statistics include additional breakdowns of 90 – 94% and !95%.  For this 
reason, the percentages of the green, purple, and cerulean-colored bars are included in the orange-colored bar, 
and the purple and cerulean-colored bars are included in the ceil-blue bar on the far right. 
 
Other vertically-driven immunization campaigns have shown considerable signs of progress.  
In 2009, a team of 20,000 health workers vaccinated 2.8 million children in three days, using a 
brand new polio vaccine that immunizes against two separate strains of the disease.203  Not only 
was this campaign successful based on the number of children vaccinated given the short 
timeframe, but the efforts were endorsed by the Taliban insurgency in a written letter of support 
issued through the ICRC.204  Anti-government insurgents fighting in Afghanistan rarely negotiate 
with aid agencies, and have even killed aid workers in targeted attacks.205  Vaccinators also 
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worked to expand National Immunization Days (NIDs) throughout Afghanistan, with six 
separate NIDs in 2009 alone.206 
Overall, policy experts were optimistic that the efforts to boost immunization rates in 
Afghanistan were showing signs of success.  “The success of National Immunisation Days may 
well eliminate polio from Afghanistan in the next year or two,” wrote Ronald Waldman and 
Homaira Hanif, two policy experts at the AREU.  Waldman and Hanif, acknowledging that polio 
does not significantly contribute to Afghanistan’s high mortality rates, continued: “In contrast [to 
efforts to eradicate polio], the implementation of the measles mortality reduction strategy that 
targets children from the age of six months in specific geographic areas…can have a substantial 
impact, if sustained.”207 
These vertical campaigns have done more than just boost immunization rates: it provided 
people who often do not utilize health services with necessary preventative treatments and 
worked to further solidify the presence of health workers at the community level.  In this sense, 
vertical campaigns have been essential in efforts to reach out to at-risk communities and further 
legitimize the role of health workers in remote areas. 
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4.0  POLICY AND FUTURE PLANNING 
Without a doubt, considerable progress has been made in improving the quality and scope of 
services delivered in health facilities in Afghanistan.  In particular, the availability of care has 
been expanded significantly in a very short period of time, year-to-year improvements have been 
steady across most provinces, and the MoPH has made great strides in working to standardize 
care nationwide to ensure that the residents of each province have access to the same services.  
But improvements in health systems alone do not result in improvements in overall health.  
Mortality rates in Afghanistan remain high and the benefits of improving the health sector risk 
going unnoticed by the Afghan people if further efforts are not made to promote the utilization of 
health services, especially by pregnant women.  Working to further incorporate at-risk 
populations such as pregnant women into the health sector will result in declining mortality rates 
and further work to legitimize the efforts of the government by demonstrating its capacity to 
provide essential public services.  In keeping with this, several issues must be considered and 
addressed in order to ensure that health is addressed in a comprehensive and all-inclusive 
fashion. 
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4.1 THE DOWNWARD PUSH OF SERVICES TO THE COMMUNITY LEVEL 
Despite considerable progress in efforts to improve access to health services, many Afghans 
live in regions where health facilities are extremely scarce.  In Uruzgan, for example, the 
province shares one provincial hospital, five CHCs, five BHCs, and one sub health center, the 
lowest amount out of any province.208  Uruzgan also has a low level of doctors, with 0.01 for 
every 1,000 people.209  Not surprisingly, Uruzgan also has the second highest U5MR in the 
country, with three out of every ten children not living long enough to reach the age of five.210  
As a partial solution, the MoPH must work to provide as many health services as possible in 
smaller health facilities to ensure that residents of remote regions have access to services.  While 
many of the services provided by the MoPH require a level of expertise that exceeds the training 
of CHWs and TBAs, emergency care services that do not require extensive medical training 
must be placed in the hands of health workers at the community level to ensure a broader 
expansion of care.   
Ensuring that CHWs and TBAs are trained to diagnose and treat potentially fatal conditions 
such as diarrhea through oral rehydration, pneumonia through antibiotics, or malaria through 
chloroquine will help to keep mortality rates low.211  The primary strain of the malaria virus in 
Afghanistan is P. vivax, which makes up roughly 80 percent of recent diagnoses and is sensitive 
to chloroquine.212  While the chloroquine-resistant P. falciparum is believed to be on the rise, 
malaria-related mortality rates could decline through diagnosis and treatment in nearby facilities 
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followed by a referral to a BHC if the condition has not improved within 24 hours.213  In an 
assessment of the Afghan health system, AREU experts Ronald Waldman and Homaira Hanif 
discussed the merits of pushing down health services, arguing that the health system will 
“probably have to become more flexible, more permissive and more creative in the future” in 
order to improve the delivery of basic services.214 
4.2 LIMITATIONS OF HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL APPROACHES 
The use of vertical campaigns to address immunization and, at a broader level, child health in 
Afghanistan has demonstrated just how successful policymakers can be when working to combat 
particular crises within the broader field of health.  But vertical campaigns come with a 
considerable number of burdens and limitations.  The most obvious limitation of a vertical 
program is the potential resulting gap in quality of care if one particular issue is targeted at the 
expense of an effort to improve the system as a whole.  In an assessment on recent efforts by the 
WHO to expand collaboration with organizations in the private sector, critics of such an effort 
feared that the result of such collaboration could be the presence of “islands of excellence in seas 
of underprovision.”215  Such concerns may be aptly used to describe vertical programs in health 
systems, since efforts to target issues such as immunization vertically “does not address health as 
more than the absence of disease.”216  Vertical programs also run the risk of creating 
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redundancies and duplication, since such programs are often managed by separate organizations 
rather than in collaboration with other actors in the field of health.  This, of course, results in 
wasted funding, which is already scarce.   
But horizontal sector-wide approaches also come with certain risks.  Though vertical 
programs might be wasteful and result in gaps in quality of care, efforts to improve the health 
system as a whole do not necessarily result in improvements for mortality rates if health services 
are not being effectively utilized.  “The logic of doing a few things well rather than many things 
badly is undeniable,” one author said while discussing the merits of vertical programs.217  
Another author noted that, while vertical programs may result in “fragile, isolated islands of 
sufficiency,” horizontal programs may lead to “generalized insufficiency,” with no signs of 
progress anywhere. 
Sector-wide approaches to improve health, such as the BPHS in Afghanistan, are fairly new 
approaches that only began to pick up steam in the 1990s – due in part to advocacy for such an 
approach by the World Bank – and remain largely untested worldwide.  Efforts to improve health 
in a horizontal fashion tend to rely heavily on leadership and regulation by the national 
government of a developing country, as is the case in Afghanistan.  This requires a government 
with the managerial capacity to effectively lead – an area in which a state as fragile as 
Afghanistan is admittedly deficient.  Such an approach further risks the possibility of being 
implemented in a top-down bureaucratic fashion, something that may be a cause for concern in 
Afghanistan.   
However, efforts to improve conditions sector-wide run the risk of neglecting the main health 
priorities in a region.  Indeed, a recent report from the organization Advocacy to Control 
                                                
217 Goodburn, Elizabeth and Campbell, Oona. “Reducing maternal mortality in the developing world: sector-wide 
approaches may be the key.” British Medical Journal. Vol. 322, No. 7291. 2001, p. 918 
 73 
Tuberculosis Internationally (ACTION) assessing the ability of sector-wide reforms in health to 
address TB in sub-Saharan Africa found that “the World Bank and its development partners 
urgently need to adjust their approach to [sector-wide approaches] if [they] are to effectively and 
efficiently produce better health outcomes.”218  ACTION’s report continued, stating that it was 
“difficult to find evidence that [sector-wide approaches] were enabling improvements in health 
outcomes” at all, let alone in efforts to combat the transmission of TB.219  Moreover, ACTION 
argued, since this approach is intended to improve health conditions sector wide, their findings 
on the inability for a sector-wide approach to show improvements in combating TB raise doubts 
about its ability to effectively tackle any individual health indicator within a system as a 
whole.220  With these findings in mind, the BPHS in Afghanistan – a sector-wide approach by 
definition – should include a stronger focus on maternal health, since conditions for mothers in 
Afghanistan are the most in need of attention. 
This disagreement is one of the defining fights of health policy: vertical health programs may 
work in the short term to improve health indicators but these improvements may not be 
sustainable without continuous efforts directed towards improving the health sector across the 
board; at the same time, efforts aimed at improving the health system run the risk of ignoring 
particular crises that require the most urgent need, and can only be successful if people actually 
further utilize the services that are being improved. 
As a middle approach to this debate, many policy experts have recently been advocating for 
what is considered to be a “diagonal” approach to improving health: using vertical and targeted 
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outreach efforts intended to seek out at-risk communities and further incorporate them into the 
improving health sector.  This approach, which would require teams of workers participating in 
the type of door-to-door efforts seen in vertical campaigns, would work to educate rural 
communities about the need for health services, particularly in regard to topics such as maternal 
and child health, HIV/AIDS prevention, and nutrition to combat preventable diseases.  At the 
same time, governments and donor agencies can work to improve the conditions of the health 
sector, make facilities more accessible, expand the availability of health services, and improve 
the managerial capacity of facilities.   
Julio Frenk, former Minister of Health in Mexico and current Dean of the Harvard School of 
Public Health, urged in a 2006 speech to the WHO in Kenya for the consideration for a diagonal 
approach to health services and called for policy experts to transcend the “false dichotomies” of 
the horizontal-vertical debate.221  The result, Frenk continued, would be a comprehensive 
strategy that uses “explicit intervention priorities to drive the required improvements into the 
health system” and place the topic of health at the center of a broader social agenda.222 
But such an initiative – working to implement community-level door-to-door efforts intended 
to boost the utilization of health services in Afghanistan – would require considerable manpower 
and the continued presence of health workers in local communities to keep referral rates high.  
Currently, the number of women in Afghanistan who give birth under the attendance of a health 
worker, either trained or untrained, is disturbingly low, and births performed within the home 
make up the vast majority of cases.  This is due in part to cultural practices and in part to lack of 
awareness of the need for medical care and the potential risks and complications of a pregnancy.  
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There is little doubt that the low number of births performed with the presence of a skilled 
attendant presents a considerable obstacle in efforts to reduce mortality rates.   
What is needed in Afghanistan, therefore, is an increased number of community-level health 
workers – ones with knowledge of and experience in dealing with pregnancy, even if they 
possess little to no training.  Unfortunately, due largely to the regressive policies of the Taliban, 
which forbade women the right to work outside the home or enroll in schools, there are few 
female workers operating in the health sector at all.  Efforts to further train female health 
workers have been slow, since training 
takes many years and many Afghan 
women are illiterate.  This places 
efforts to improve health conditions in 
Afghanistan in a considerable bind: 
mortality rates will not see any 
significant improvement without further efforts to increase the percentage of births performed 
outside of the home, cultural sensitivities make it difficult for such efforts to be done by men, 
and female health workers are incredibly scarce.   
Considering these obstacles, the central government must work to further incorporate women 
into the health sector and utilize every available resource to increase the percentage of births 
performed under the attendance of a health worker with some degree of experience in childbirth 
if it hopes to see any reduction in maternal mortality. To improve these efforts, the central 
government should work to further incorporate the efforts of TBAs into the health system, 
streamline their training, and supervise their activities.  These women are often the first point of 
contact between pregnant mothers in rural communities and the health sector as a whole and 
Table 11: Percentage of births attended, by skill level 
of health worker 
Type of Attendant % of Births Attended 
Doctor, midwife, nurse 8.0% 
Trained or untrained TBA 8.8% 
Relatives, friends, others 83.1% 
Source: “Maternal health services at the 
community level in Afghanistan: Who should 
provide these services?” Reproductive Health 
Task Force. Ministry of Health. Transitional 
Islamic Government of Afghanistan. 2003 
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should be used as part of a vertical outreach campaign to further educate mothers on healthy 
lifestyle practices.   
As part of a diagonal approach to improve health in Afghanistan, the central government 
could use TBAs as local messengers, emphasizing the need for the utilization of health services, 
the warning signs of a pregnancy, and the importance of breastfeeding.  TBAs can also work to 
provide vitamins and nutrition to pregnant mothers and infants, educate about the prevention of 
sexually-transmitted infections (STIs), or even to supply pregnant women with delivery kits of 
basic supplies.  Just like vaccinators in vertical immunization campaigns, TBAs can travel door 
to door to provide women with the basic services they need to be healthy.   
TBAs must be used to fill in the gaps that result from the severe shortage of qualified 
midwives in Afghanistan.  Furthermore, though it is obviously not desirable, TBAs should be 
prepared to handle pregnancies in cases where women either refuse to give birth outside of the 
home or simply cannot do so in a health facility due to inaccessibility.  TBAs are often illiterate 
and lack the necessary medical expertise to handle complex pregnancies and provide EOC, but 
the MoPH must accept that having attendance by an untrained or poorly trained worker is likely 
better than having no attendance at all.  Starting as early as the 1970s, UNFPA began working to 
further improve the training of TBAs in an effort to improve maternal and child health 
worldwide.  This effort soon became known as the Safe Motherhood Initiative. 
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4.3 THE SAFE MOTHERHOOD INITIATIVE AND TRADITIONAL BIRTH 
ATTENDANTS 
In 1987, public officials from developing countries across the world met with representatives 
from UNFPA, the World Bank, and the WHO in Nairobi, Kenya to discuss issues of maternal 
health.  This meeting, known as the International Conference on Safe Motherhood, was the first 
conference of the Safe Motherhood Initiative (SMI), and the first summit in which the 
international community focused exclusively on women’s issues and maternal health.223 By the 
mid 1990s, however, efforts to seek a global consensus on issues of safe motherhood began to 
fall apart due to resistance from donors towards funding broad and complex programs on 
women’s health, heated debates surrounding the contentious issue of abortion, and a lack of 
commitment from political leaders unwilling to prioritize an agenda that advanced the conditions 
of women.224   
Women’s rights advocates emphasized the need for a broad approach to reduce maternal 
mortality, advocating for a wide array of goals for the SMI, some of which were feasible and 
others perhaps a bit quixotic.  These ideas included topics ranging from the education of young 
girls, the prevalence of early marriage, and the social standing of women in society – issues that, 
despite being clearly linked to women’s health, resided outside of the scope of any one UN 
agency or national health ministry.  Many of the goals of the SMI were so broad as to require 
collaboration between ministries of health, education, and women’s affairs – agencies that often 
compete with one another for funding rather than collaborate for projects.  Due to the structure of 
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UN agencies, the topic of maternal health was, in many respects, a crisis without a home.  UN 
efforts on health rely on agencies such as the WHO, which does not specialize exclusively in 
women’s health, UNICEF, which focuses on children, and UNFPA, which focused more on 
population growth than reproductive health until the 1994 International Conference on 
Population and Development.225   
By the end of the first decade, the results of the SMI were widely seen as being unsuccessful.  
Critics noted that countries implementing policies based on the recommendations of the SMI had 
failed to demonstrate reductions in their MMR.226  Others argued that, due to the overly broad 
goals of the SMI, the approach was burdened by efforts to seek too many reforms in too many 
sectors in too short of a time frame.227   
In many countries, including Afghanistan, a goal of the SMI was to improve the training of 
TBAs in an effort to reduce MMR.228 Though most TBAs are illiterate and lack basic medical 
training, most are older women with children of their own and are trusted members of the 
communities in which they live.229  There is considerable variation in training techniques 
throughout the world and the depth and style of training may vary based upon the instructor in 
charge of such a training program.  Individuals, NGOs, or national and local governments can 
serve as TBA trainers and often possess standards and objectives unique to their institution.  
Training can last for several days or several months, and can include routine supervision and 
updates in education and techniques.  Some TBA training programs also include services such as 
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prevention, screening, and referral, though most TBAs are not trained to handle maternal or 
neonatal complications such as postpartum hemorrhage or birth asphyxia.230  Due to their lack of 
medical training, however, TBAs often work in resource-poor environments and lack essential 
materials and skills to handle EOC. 
In just a few years, however, experts grew skeptical that training TBAs would demonstrate 
any significant reduction in MMR, and the effort was widely viewed as wasteful and ineffective 
by the late 1990s.231  Along with the general consensus that the SMI had failed to produce 
demonstrable results, many countries began to scale down efforts to train TBAs in favor of 
training skilled midwives.232  Afghanistan was one of these countries and expressed concerns 
that TBAs “do not possess the necessary skills to manage the obstetrical complications that can 
result in maternal mortality.”233 
This decision to discontinue the training of TBAs in many countries and the consensus that 
the SMI has been unsuccessful may have been premature, however.  A recent study on the 
effectiveness of TBA training to reduce maternal and perinatal mortality in Pakistan found that 
effective training of TBAs led to a 30 percent reduction in stillbirths and neonatal deaths.234  The 
study found similar results for MMR reduction with a 25 percent decline in maternal death.  
Some of the findings from this study can be found in Table 13 below.  However, despite the 
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study’s large sample size, the number of maternal deaths in the study was relatively small.235  As 
a result, the authors admitted, the study does not necessarily demonstrate a decline in MMR, 
though the study was not designed to detect a variation in such a small and difficult indicator to 
measure.236  After all, though maternal mortality is an urgent global concern, it is statistically 
infrequent and therefore extremely difficult to accurately monitor.   
Table 12: Maternal and perinatal deaths and mortality rates according to study group 
 Singleton births*  
 
Women 
 Perinatal 
deaths – no. 
(no. per 1,000 
live births and 
stillbirths)† 
Stillbirths – no. 
(no. per 1,000 
live births and 
stillbirths)‡ 
Neonatal 
deaths – no. 
(no. per 1,000 
live births)§ 
 Maternal 
deaths – no. 
(no. per 
100,000 
pregnancies)¶ 
Intervention Group 
Cluster 1 
(N = 3253) 
232 (71) 130 (40) 102 (33) Cluster 1 
(N = 3408) 
6 (176) 
Cluster 2 
(N = 3835) 
361 (94) 227 (59) 134 (37) Cluster 2 
(N = 3980) 
15 (377) 
Cluster 3 
(N = 2622) 
230 (88) 126 (48) 104 (42) Cluster 3 
(N = 2704) 
6 (222) 
Total 
(N = 9710) 
823 (85) 483 (50) 340 (37) Total 
(N = 10,092) 
27 (268) 
Control Group 
Cluster 4 
(N = 2686) 
266 (99) 149 (55) 117 (46) Cluster 4 
(N = 2794) 
11 (394) 
Cluster 5 
(N = 1947) 
296 (152) 178 (91) 118 (67) Cluster 5 
(N = 2061) 
8 (388) 
Cluster 6 
(N = 1879) 
224 (119) 143 (76) 81 (47) Cluster 6 
(N = 1965) 
7 (356) 
Cluster 7 
(N = 2477) 
291 (117) 168 (68) 123 (53) Cluster 7 
(N = 2612) 
8 (306) 
Total 
(N = 8989) 
1077 (120) 638 (71) 439 (53) Total 
(N = 8989) 
34 (360) 
* Perinatal outcomes are for singleton births only 
† Perinatal deaths were defined as stillbirths or live-born infants who died within 28 days after birth 
‡ Stillbirths were defined as fetuses born after six months that never showed signs of life 
§ Neonatal deaths were defined as live-born babies who died within 28 days after birth 
¶ Maternal deaths were defined as death of the mother during pregnancy, delivery, and up to six weeks 
postpartum, excluding deaths known to be due to injury or accident 
 
Source: Jokhio, Abdul Hakeem and Winter, Heather R. and Cheng, Kar Keung. “An 
intervention involving traditional birth attendants and perinatal and maternal 
mortality in Pakistan.” The New England Journal of Medicine. Vol. 352. 2005, p. 2097 
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The resulting reductions in stillbirths and neonatal deaths were significant, however, and 
have reignited the debate over the effectiveness of TBAs in the health sector.  Separate from 
improvements in mortality rates, the study also found that more women in the experimental 
group were referred to health facilities due to recognized complications during pregnancy, an 
indication that TBAs could further work to improve the utilization of health facilities by pregnant 
women.237   
The authors of the study noted that:  
International bodies have moved away from further consideration of the role of 
TBAs in favour of skilled birth attendants for all.  This stance might be the ideal 
to work towards, but evidence of successful implementation of this approach is 
so far rare and many years are likely to pass and many more mothers and babies 
to die, especially in rural parts of developing countries, before this ideal is 
achieved.  The medical and traditional birth systems could be integrated rather 
than seen as mutually exclusive.238 
 
Another recent report on the effectiveness of TBA training to improve maternal health noted that 
the results of the aforementioned study “provide evidence in support of TBA training in a rural 
setting with a functional health system.”239   
In India, where efforts to train TBAs have gradually been phased out over the past decade, 
some health experts are advocating the reincorporation of TBAs back into the health sector.  
With the looming deadline for completion of the Millennium Development Goals, health experts 
in India are hoping that, despite their lack of medical training, TBAs can provide some basic 
services to pregnant women, alleviating some of the workload from scarce skilled midwives.240  
Advocacy for renewed training of TBAs is not limited to India, however.  Anthony Costello, 
head of the Centre for International Health and Development at University College London, 
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voiced his skepticism of the consensus that TBAs are an ineffective approach towards improving 
maternal health in a 2006 piece in The Lancet, arguing that international agencies and experts 
have persuaded governments to discontinue TBA training “without robust evidence” that such an 
approach is ineffective.241  “Traditional birth attendants are not a substitute for midwives,” 
Costello wrote, “but they are the main provider of care during delivery for millions of women, 
especially in settings where mortality rates are high.” 
Now, more than a decade after experts declared that the goals of the SMI – such as the 
training of TBAs – had been unsuccessful, the trend appears to be moving back in the direction 
of the SMI.  Ann Starrs, founder of Family Care International, has said that, though progress has 
been slow in reducing MMR and that mistakes were made in the initial years of SMI policy 
planning, the SMI has worked to make maternal health a key issue in global health.  “The 
perception that the Safe Motherhood Initiative failed is perhaps understandable from a superficial 
perspective,” Starrs wrote, “but that perception is nevertheless unfounded and unacceptable.”242 
In Afghanistan, where TBAs are common, skilled midwives are scarce, and maternal 
mortality is overwhelmingly high, policy experts are turning to the SMI for answers. Waldman 
and Hanif noted in their assessment of health in Afghanistan that the goals of the SMI, with a 
“particular emphasis on the provision of emergency obstetrical care, is a proven intervention that 
could, in time, bring about an important reduction in maternal mortality.”243  UNICEF has been 
running SMI projects in select provinces in Afghanistan for well over a decade.  After the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent collapse of the Taliban regime, UNICEF assessed the 
health conditions in Afghanistan in order to determine the progress of the SMI. 
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4.4 THE SAFE MOTHERHOOD INITIATIVE IN AFGHANISTAN 
In an effort to reduce maternal mortality in Afghanistan in 1997, UNICEF began 
implementing health programs in four provinces: Logar, Laghman, Farah, and Balkh.244  These 
programs, which aimed to reduce maternal mortality, focused on strengthening EOC, improving 
management and supervision in maternal health, and boosting community involvement.  Three 
years later, UNICEF recruited an external consultant to assess the results of the efforts in these 
provinces and to suggest recommendations for the future, as mentioned earlier in this paper.  The 
results were fairly critical, citing an “underperformance and shortfall on the side of UNICEF 
Afghanistan to view the Safe Motherhood Initiative as a programme … and to give it the time 
and effort that it rightly warrants.”245  Despite having three years to produce results, the 
assessment noted, the SMI in Afghanistan was “still very much in its infancy.”246  
The report recommended a broad array of efforts to improve maternal health conditions, 
including the development of national training materials for EOC, the implementation of an 
immunization campaign against maternal and neonatal tetanus, the creation of a list of drugs and 
equipment needed to equip health facilities, and continued training of women in midwifery 
skills.247  The most interesting recommendation, however, was that UNICEF in Afghanistan 
work to develop effective communication strategies that will result in a “behavior change,” 
sensitize men and women to the warning signs of a pregnancy, and support women’s access to 
medical care.248  The report stressed that such efforts must be done with the active participation 
of local leaders and members of the community and could utilize quotations from the Quran to 
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validate their goals.  Such an effort would be in keeping with a vertical education and outreach 
campaign. 
Despite how critical the overall report was, it did note some accomplishments in efforts to 
improve maternal health, including the training of 33 TBAs by the MoPH and another 35 TBAs 
by NGOs located in Logar province.249  The report urged for further efforts to connect the work 
of TBAs to nearby clinics, provide TBAs with more supplies, and implement regular refresher 
courses to ensure continued quality of training.  In particular, the poor linkages between health 
facilities and TBAs working at the community level were cited as one of the major constraints 
for improving conditions of maternal health in all provinces.250  The Dutch non-profit HNI, 
which was working to deliver health services in Nangarhar province, was cited for its 
“innovative” method of providing health services, which involved clustering small districts 
together under similar management and working in close collaboration with TBAs.251  “This is 
one example that may be replicated in other regions and the concepts within this model may be 
applicable” to provinces covered by the SMI efforts, the report noted.252 
In 2002, after the collapse of the Taliban government and the establishment of the Interim 
Government, UNICEF assessed conditions of the SMI once again, but this time they surveyed 
more than just the four provinces covered under the SMI.  For provinces not covered under the 
SMI, conditions were in worse shape and criticism was particularly harsh.  “The almost total lack 
of use of recommended international infection practices limits the quality of all basic and 
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comprehensive [emergency obstetrical care] services being provided,” wrote the consultant 
surveying conditions in Kabul.253   
In Laghman province, which had been covered by the SMI, the assessments were not as dire.  
The hospital in Laghman provided EOC services on a 24-hour basis, but the consultant suggested 
that their “ability to respond quickly and appropriately to obstetrical emergencies should be 
strengthened” through refresher trainings.254  The consultant further noted that Mehtarlam 
Hospital in Laghman had “functional management systems in place for drug procurement” and 
operated an “outpatient antenatal care department offering full service,” including tetanus 
immunization, nutrition, health education, and bed-net distribution.255  The consultant did 
express concerns of overcrowding in the facility, and recommended that workers seek to 
reorganize available space.  Overcrowding, it was feared, could lead to patients being discharged 
too quickly, defeating the purpose of delivery with a skilled attendant.256 
Conditions in Badakhshan province were reviewed much more critically, however.  The 
mountainous terrain makes much of the province inaccessible, and it is located in the 
northwestern most corner of the country, rendering it even more isolated.  The consultant in 
Badakhshan urged for the development of a new MCH unit in the provincial hospital to provide 
basic maternal services.257  The hospital was also lacking a generator, lighting, and basic surgical 
equipment. 
Throughout the report, assessments of conditions in provinces covered under the SMI 
seemed less critical than those of provinces that remained uncovered.  One exception to this was 
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in the assessment of Herat province, where the consultant praised the hospital’s training 
techniques and guidelines, in-house training room, stock of emergency supplies, and health 
education materials.258  Among the likely reasons for the superior conditions in Herat are the 
province’s considerable wealth from customs revenue generated from trade with Iran and the 
efforts of then-governor Ismail Khan to improve security.   
Across all provinces, the UNICEF report urged immediate action in efforts to update and 
standardize training manuals for health workers, shorten the length of midwife training, 
strengthen the capacity of the MoPH on issues of maternal health, and begin an experimental 
program for training midwives using low-literacy approaches over a one-year duration.259  The 
overall goal of the final recommendation was to provide the country with auxiliary midwives 
with medical training in basic essential skills. 
Despite the report’s urging for more skilled midwives, it praised the work of TBAs in 
Afghanistan and noted the considerable achievements in TBA training in the previous few years.  
“Successful SMI programs in Afghanistan consider TBAs an integral part of …their programs,” 
the report noted.260  The report went on to note the success in efforts to develop a system of 
training TBAs within their communities, boosting supervision of TBA training, and providing 
TBAs with regular refresher trainings.  In addition, the report noted achievements in linking 
them to health facilities and improving their access to essential materials supplies.   
It is certainly still the case that the effectiveness of TBAs in reducing mortality rates and 
improving maternal health is unclear.  Detailed studies that measure their effectiveness are scarce 
and those working to shed further light in this field face considerable obstacles.  Assessing the 
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rate of maternal death is difficult by itself due to the size 
of the ratio; assessing improvements over a period of 
time using a minimum of one experimental group and 
one control group require an immense sample size, and 
may still fail to shed light on the issue.  But the body of 
evidence showing that improving TBA training improves 
health outcomes overall is quickly growing, and the 
consensus that TBAs are ineffective is beginning to fade. 
It would seem that the efforts of the SMI in Logar, 
Laghman, Farah, and Balkh have shown signs of success.  
In comparison to other provinces, Logar and Laghman 
have the fifth and sixth lowest MMR nationwide, while Farah is ranked eighth.  Balkh remains 
near the national average, however.  It is difficult to tell if the conditions in these provinces have 
improved as a result of the SMI or if the real cause is something unrelated to health policy, such 
as security or funding.  But provinces working under the SMI have mortality rates ranked just 
below the larger and wealthier provinces of Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar, despite having 
considerably fewer health facilities.  Kabul and Herat had 137 and 84 health facilities in 2009, 
respectively.261  Logar and Laghman, on the other hand, had 34 and 43, while Farah had even 
fewer at just 29 health facilities in the area.  In addition, Logar and Laghman have two of the 
highest rates of expectant mothers receiving antenatal care, with Laghman ranked fifth overall 
and Logar ranked second only to Kabul.  Laghman also has the fourth lowest percentage of 
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Table 13: Maternal mortality 
rankings by province, lowest to 
highest 
1 Kabul 700 
2 Herat 900 
3 Kandahar 1,100 
4 Nangarhar 1,100 
5 Logar 1,200 
6 Lagman 1,200 
7 Nimroz 1600 
8 Farah 1600 
   
AVG. Helmand 1,800 
   
29 Badakhshan 2,200 
30 Takhar 2,300 
31 Badghis 2,300 
32 Ghor 2,300 
Source: World Health 
Organization, “Best Estimates” 
Provincial Fact Sheets 
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births performed in the home, indicating that an unusual number of women utilize health 
facilities in this province.262 
4.5 RECONSIDERING THE CONSENSUS ON TRADITIONAL BIRTH 
ATTENDANTS 
Despite a growing body of evidence to the contrary, many policy experts in Afghanistan and 
around the world remain skeptical that TBAs can be used effectively in campaigns to improve 
maternal health.  Instead, they argue, governments should prioritize the training of skilled 
midwives in an effort to phase out the use of TBAs in health services.  The reasons for this are 
fairly compelling.  TBAs lack adequate medical training and have no knowledge of how to 
perform EOC; they often operate without supervision or association with health facilities in the 
area and are rarely subject to refresher trainings; most are illiterate and have little in the way of 
education; and they operate in poor working conditions and lack access to vital materials, 
equipment, and medicine.  Given how severe Afghanistan’s health crisis really is, given the 
nation’s astronomical rate of maternal mortality, and given the fact that only one child in four 
lives to the age of five, it would be enormously reckless to declare that a resource as common 
and potentially valuable in efforts to improve maternal and neonatal health “ineffective” without 
first investigating the connection further.   
Yet the MoPH did just that in a publication on the delivery of maternal health services in 
2003, stating that, in keeping with “international consensus,” TBAs do not meet the necessary 
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criteria that would allow for them to play a role in maternal health, citing their lack of “necessary 
skills to manage the obstetrical complications that can result in maternal mortality.”263 As a 
result, the MoPH proposed that the training of TBAs be discontinued, and that “TBAs be invited 
to participate in CHW training, thus becoming female CHWs.”264  This approach, while perhaps 
desirable, sounds impractical.  In the outlined job description for CHWs as defined in the BPHS, 
the selection criteria notes that “basic literacy is advantageous,” but notes that it is not a 
requirement.265  The vast majority of TBAs are illiterate, and most are of an age that makes 
developing skills in basic literacy difficult.  Nonetheless, the MoPH report on the delivery of 
maternal health proposes that illiterate TBAs be able to “participate in specifically-designed 
CHW training programs for low to no literacy.”266  Due to the urgent need for more health 
workers in Afghanistan, the MoPH has reduced the number of years of required training for 
midwives from three years to two.267  While boosting literacy rates is certainly an important goal, 
it seems counterintuitive for these efforts to further delay the utilization of workers in the health 
sector, especially when the training of such workers in the field of maternal health is being cut 
short. 
Policymakers in Afghanistan must come to accept that health workers in all provinces are 
scarce, and that female health workers in particular are in very short supply.  Rather than 
discontinuing the training of TBAs, the MoPH should work to further establish a relationship 
between skilled midwives, CHWs trained in delivery, and TBAs.   The number of women who 
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give birth under the attendance of a health worker, either trained or untrained, is disturbingly 
low, and efforts to improve maternal health must work to improve skilled attendance during 
birth.  But the need to further address maternal health and the severe shortage of resources that 
allow such an effort to work do not allow for the MoPH to take any method of improving 
maternal health off the table.  Actors in the health field must take advantage of every available 
resource if they hope to see any reduction in maternal mortality.  If they do not, they may find 
themselves improving the conditions of a health sector that continues to be underutilized. 
Working to improve outreach to rural women, educate about the need for skilled assistance 
during birth, the importance of breastfeeding, or the symptoms that indicate that a pregnancy has 
become problematic does not require any advanced medical training.  All of these are services 
for which a TBA is not only fully qualified, but ones in which she has an advantage, given her 
trusted status in her community.  Efforts to further train TBAs in midwifery skills, boost literacy 
rates, and to provide further medical training are commendable and should be continued.  But in 
regions where skilled midwives are scarce and MMR is exceptionally high, utilization on TBAs 
is essential and the goal of ensuring that all pregnancies take place under the supervision of a 
trained midwife seems impractical.   
It seems unwise to view efforts to improve maternal health through a dichotomy that does not 
reflect the conditions in Afghanistan.  While the presence of a trained midwife during a delivery 
would no doubt be preferable to the presence of an untrained TBA, the scarcity of female health 
workers with necessary medical training makes the first option entirely unattainable for most 
Afghans.  The dilemma is more aptly presented as one between the attendance of a TBA with 
little to no training but some previous experience in delivery or having nobody present but the 
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father and family.  Viewed from this perspective, the role of a TBA as a messenger and a 
representative of the health system at the community level should be further strengthened. 
In a 2006 report by the AREU assessing the improvements in health services since 2001, the 
authors noted that, “health service delivery in a post-conflict context can also help legitimize a 
fragile government.  This in turn can contribute to long-term political stability – a pre-condition 
for the fullest possible implementation of health policies and programmes on a national scale.”268  
Furthermore, the report noted: 
It stands to reason that one way for a government to reduce the risk of a country 
regressing back to widespread conflict is to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of 
the population.  To achieve this, the government needs to show that it is capable 
of fulfilling one of the key functions of an effective state – providing essential 
services such as health and education.  ...A post-conflict health system should 
also consider adopting the political objective of contributing to long-term peace 
by helping improve the perception of the fragile government, thereby 
contributing to its legitimization.269 
 
Improving the legitimacy of the state, they argued, requires putting a further emphasis on 
expanding outreach at the community level and working to better understand “people’s health-
seeking behavior.”270  The activities of TBAs such as educating mothers about the need for 
proper breastfeeding and nutrition and the importance of EOC for complicated pregnancies 
would work to advance such a goal. 
Working to decrease reliance on TBAs as an actor in the health sector weakens the 
connections between communities and health services and further exacerbates the shortage of 
health workers in Afghanistan.  Instead, the MoPH should seek to streamline the role of TBAs 
into the delivery of services at the community level and utilize their social standing as a strategy 
to reduce the workload of skilled midwives.  This objective would allow for efforts to improve 
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the delivery of health services to be fully comprehensive, with improved community-level 
engagement while efforts to improve the health sector continue.  It would be in keeping with 
efforts to further make the approach to improving health services diagonal, since the primary role 
of TBAs would be to encourage women to seek out health services, particularly in cases that 
require EOC.  Lastly, it would work to advance the priorities of the MoPH, which puts reducing 
maternal and newborn mortality at the top of its list of health priorities in its National Health 
Policy statement.271 
The MoPH further mentions in the National Health Policy statement that it aims to halve its 
MMR from its 2003 rate of 1,600 deaths per 100,000 live births by 2015, and halve it again by 
2020.272  While it is difficult to say with any certainty what the MMR in Afghanistan is today, it 
is doubtful that these goals will be achieved in this timeframe.  In Sri Lanka and Malaysia, two 
countries that successfully halved their MMR over a decade on several occasions, two major 
explanations for this success were the political stability and the strong presence of health services 
in rural regions, two things that are still in the making in Afghanistan.273  Neither of these 
countries relied on TBAs to reduce MMR, but the circumstances were also considerably 
different: the shortage of female staff was likely not as pronounced, health services were likely in 
better shape, security was far better, and MMR was considerably lower.274  At the start of efforts 
to reduce MMR in Sri Lanka in 1947, the rate was two thirds of what it is currently in 
Afghanistan.275  In Malaysia, the rate was less than a third of what Afghanistan currently faces.  
Reducing maternal mortality, even by a modest amount, will take many years, especially in a 
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state as fragile as Afghanistan, and must include the use of every available resource in order to 
boost the utilization of services. 
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5.0   CONCLUSION 
Despite the ongoing conflict, the delivery of health services has improved significantly in the 
past several years.  There have been a considerable number of obstacles and challenges that have 
slowed down and impeded this process.  Infrastructure in Afghanistan has been abhorrent ever 
since the Soviet invasion.  The scars caused by decades of war can be seen not just on the faces 
of Afghans, but on the very terrain itself, which remains riddled with landmines that further 
degrade the health and safety of the Afghan people.  Years of oppression by the Taliban left an 
entire generation of women illiterate, with no education, no work experience, and no feeling of 
value to society.  The rising insurgency and resulting bombings have kept security conditions in 
Afghanistan relatively unstable.  The cultivation of poppy continues to fund anti-government 
militia groups that terrorize rural communities.  Corruption runs rampant throughout all divisions 
of the public sector, further hampering the utilization of public services.   
But despite all this, health facilities in provinces throughout Afghanistan have demonstrated 
significant improvements year after year with relative consistency across indicators intended to 
assess the delivery of health services.  The coverage of these services has expanded dramatically 
over a very short period of time, and near-universal coverage could possibly be attainable in as 
little as five years.  Immense strides have been taken to expand immunization and reduce the 
prevalence of diseases such as malaria, measles, TB, and polio.  It is possible that, in just a few 
 95 
years, the results of these immunization campaigns will be reduced rates of mortality for children 
under five.   
In Kabul, these efforts have been successful in large part due to the presence of security 
forces that improve the accessibility of health services.  Herat, however, has seen similar signs of 
progress without relying as much on funds, assistance, or instruction from Kabul, indicating that 
further improving the political autonomy of wealthier provinces could result in better health 
conditions.  It remains unclear to what extent the centralized political structure of Afghanistan 
hinders improvements in health by being too “top-down” or if this is even a problem at all. 
In 2002, the AREU described the state of health services in Afghanistan as being in a state of 
“near total disrepair.”276  Just four years later, the organization declared that the “MoPH has 
made considerable progress in making the BPHS accessible to most Afghans,” but noted that, 
while independent evaluations indicated “improvements in quality of care,” it was not yet known 
whether or not the health status of the Afghan population had improved, as such statistics needed 
to be measured over a longer period of time.277  In other words, there has been great progress in 
improving health in Afghanistan sector-wide, but the resulting improvements in mortality rates 
have not yet been confirmed.  While it should come as no surprise that mortality rates are lagging 
indicators, it seems likely that mortality rates will continue to remain high and the benefits of 
improving the health sector will go unnoticed to many Afghans if further efforts are not made to 
promote the utilization of health services, especially among pregnant women. 
The successes of the BPHS and the improvements across the health sector are significant and 
should not be quickly brushed aside.  But such efforts will not achieve the broader goal of 
improving overall health if health facilities remain under-populated by the communities that need 
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care the most.  In this respect, an exclusively horizontal approach to improving health is fairly 
limited.  There are concerns among experts that maternal health often goes ignored in sector-
wide efforts towards improvement of health services.  One report suggested that a possible 
outcome of the implementation of such an approach might be that “some key activities that are 
essential to improving maternity care might not be covered,” including the reviewing and 
updating of obstetric protocols and training in specific techniques such as manual vacuum 
aspiration.278  While the authors of this report endorsed the implementation of a sector-wide 
approach as a way of improving failing public health systems, they did so with the insistence that 
such an effort include “indicators of safe motherhood” as a condition for funding, something that 
they noted has been lacking in previous sector-wide strategies.279   
Despite these concerns, advocates of horizontal, sector-wide approaches to improving health 
make a compelling case by insisting that improvements in certain health indicators will be 
inhibited if the health system as a whole is failing.  They further insist that such efforts can make 
the delivery of health care more sustainable and cost-effective – two goals that need to be 
prioritized in long-term efforts of improving health care in Afghanistan.  In Afghanistan, where 
the health system as a whole is in bad shape and mortality rates are incredibly high, the MoPH 
cannot afford to rely on one approach or the other, but must rather find a comfortable middle 
ground by assuming the responsibility of engaging in targeted efforts to incorporate at-risk 
communities into the health sector while continuing to improve the failing system as a whole.  
The MoPH must therefore work to further expand outreach at the local level using residents of 
the community as liaisons in order to improve the utilization of health services and adequately 
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address the nation’s mortality rates.  Such a job does not require using workers with advanced 
medical skills, making TBAs the perfect candidates for the job.   
While the central government should continue to advance the training of TBAs in midwifery 
in order to ensure that deliveries are performed with skilled attendance, this goal should not be 
seen as one that is in conflict with promoting the role of untrained TBAs in health.  These ideas 
are not mutually exclusive and should not be viewed as such.  Instead, the MoPH should work to 
further incorporate TBAs into the health system, streamline the objectives and roles of TBAs, 
and use their presence in small communities to its full potential.   
The MoPH must further recognize that the process of training skilled midwives will continue 
to be sluggish and that operating under the assumption that this is achievable in the short-term is 
impractical.  Women and newborns will continue to die at alarming rates so long as unsupervised 
births continue to be the norm.  In the short-term, the MoPH must come to accept that 
underserved regions lacking skilled female health workers will have to rely on TBAs in the 
delivery of newborns and the provision of nutritional supplements to mothers and children.  
There is a widespread international consensus that such efforts are inadequate and ineffective in 
improving maternal health.  But more recent evidence is casting doubt upon this claim, and the 
evidence supporting this consensus is not convincing enough to justify disregarding a resource 
with much potential in a part of the world where female health workers with any degree of 
training are immensely scarce.  The central government must work to further incorporate the 
work of TBAs into the health system, standardize their training, and supervise their activities in 
an effort to implement a community-level door-to-door campaign intended to boost the 
utilization of health services in Afghanistan.  
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Such a program would be in keeping with a diagonal approach to improving the health 
sector, using targeted outreach efforts intended to seek out at-risk communities and further 
incorporate them into the improving health sector.  The overall goal of such a campaign would 
be to educate rural communities about the need for health services, particularly in regard to 
maternal and child health and appropriate healthy lifestyle choices, such as breastfeeding and 
nutrition.  The central government and donor agencies can simultaneously work to improve the 
conditions of the health sector as a whole, making facilities more accessible, expanding the 
availability of health services, and improving the managerial capacity of facilities.   
The result would be an improvement not just in health systems or disease prevention alone, but 
an improvement in overall health.  Using TBAs as foot soldiers in a campaign to promote health 
education and the utilization of services would make use of “explicit intervention priorities to 
drive the required improvements into the health system,” an essential component in 
comprehensive improvements in health.280 The most likely route to success in efforts to improve 
health in Afghanistan must include moving past the false dichotomies of horizontal and vertical 
and must further reflect the conditions and the reality in which these efforts are taking place. 
                                                
280 Frenk, Julio. “Bridging the divide: comprehensive reform to improve health in Mexico.” WHO Commission on 
Social Determinants of Health. 2006, p. 5 
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Table 14: Roles and responsibilities in health care delivery in Afghanistan by level of governance 
Source: Evans, Anne et al. “A Guide to Government in Afghanistan,” p. 133 
Level of administration Budget-funded Funded externally 
Ministry of Health 
(Kabul) 
• Health policy-making 
• Authorizing “organigram” 
(staffing) 
• Contracts with NGOs 
• Private sector regulation 
• Recruitment of staff grades 
1–5  
• Aggregating health data 
• Donor coordination (within the region) 
Regional health 
departments (western 
provinces only) Regional hospital services: 
• Outpatient services 
• Inpatient services 
• Surgery 
• Antenatal care 
• Delivery 
• Postnatal care 
• Immunization 
• Rehabilitation 
• Health Education 
• X-ray 
• Diagnostic lab  
• Reallocation of staff 
between facilities 
• Recruitment of staff grades 
6-10  
• Contracting out services 
• Procurement of drugs and 
supplies 
• Primary health care 
• Facilities management: 
buildings, vehicles 
• Provincial health plans 
• Collecting basic health data 
• Quality control of services 
 
Provincial hospital services: 
• Outpatient services 
• Inpatient services 
• Surgery 
• Antenatal care 
• Delivery 
• Postnatal care 
• Immunization 
• Rehabilitation 
• Health education 
• X-ray (sometimes) 
• Nutrition 
• Diagnostic lab 
 
Province 
Rehabilitation facilities: • Surgery 
• Rehabilitation  
District health plans 
District hospital services: 
• Outpatient services 
• Inpatient services 
• Surgery 
• Antenatal care 
• Delivery 
• Postnatal care 
• Immunization 
• Some nutrition services 
• Health education 
• Some X-ray services 
• Diagnostics lab  
Basic health centers: 
• Outpatient services 
• Some limited surgery 
• Antenatal care 
• Some delivery 
• Postnatal care 
• Immunization 
• Some nutritional services 
• Health education 
• Some diagnostic services  
Sub-health centers: 
• Outpatient services 
• Some limited surgery 
• Some antenatal care 
• Some postnatal care 
• Immunization 
• Health education 
 
Maternal and child health clinics 
(MCHs): 
• Outpatient services 
• Antenatal care 
• Postnatal care 
• Immunization 
• Nutrition 
• Health education  
District 
Expanded program of immunization (EPI) clinics: 
• Immunization 
• Some nutrition services 
External funding is 
pervasive across the 
sector and is found 
at all levels of 
administration and 
for all functions. 
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Table 15: Functional responsibilities of different health facilities in Afghanistan 
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Regional 
hospital 
x x x x x x x  x x x x 
Provincial 
hospital 
x x x x x x x x  x some x 
District 
hospital 
x x x x x x x some  x some x 
Basic health 
center 
x  some x some x x some  x  some 
Sub-health 
center 
x  x some  some x   x   
Maternal and 
child health 
clinic (MCH) 
x   x  x x x  x   
Rehabilitation 
center 
  x      x    
Source: Evans, Anne et al. A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, p. 132 
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Figure 5: Structure of Faryab Provincial Health Department 
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Table 16: Afghanistan Health Sector Balanced Scorecard National Results of Provincial Performance 2004 – 2008 
  National Mediana Benchmarks Percent of Provinces Meeting 
Lower Benchmark 
Percent of Provinces Meeting 
Upper Benchmark 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Lowerb Upperc 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
A. Patients and Community 
1 Overall Patient Satisfaction 83.1 86.3 86.0 77.7 81.0 66.4 90.9 81.3 96.7 96.7 93.3 93.1 18.8 26.7 20.0 3.3 20.7 
2 Patient Perception of 
Quality Index 
76.0 76.2 80.3 77.6 77.5 66.2 83.9 81.8 96.7 96.7 96.7 100 18.2 10.0 33.3 10.0 44.8 
3 Written Shura-e-sehie 
activitiesd 
34.2 54.5 66.4 86.0 94.3 18.1 66.5 81.8 83.3 93.3 100 100 18.2 26.7 50.0 90.0 93.1 
B. Staff 
4 Health Worker Satisfaction 
Index 
63.5 64.1 68.1 69.0 69.1 56.1 67.9 81.8 86.7 93.3 93.3 96.6 18.2 33.3 53.3 56.7 62.1 
5 Salary Payments current 76.7 90.0 81.3 90.7 82.7 52.4 92.0 81.8 96.7 83.3 83.3 82.8 18.2 43.3 33.3 46.7 41.4 
C. Capacity for Service Provision 
6 Equipment Functionality 
Indexe 
65.7 67.0 78.7 83.8 88.4 61.3 90.0 81.8 73.3 86.7 100 100 0.0 0.0 3.3 100 100 
7 Drug Availability Index 71.1 83.7 85.7 81.0 86.3 53.3 81.8 81.8 100 100 96.7 100 18.2 56.7 53.3 46.7 58.6 
8 Family Planning Availability 
Index 
61.4 70.0 82.9 93.7 94.9 43.4 80.3 81.8 90.0 100 100 100 18.2 23.3 53.3 93.3 93.1 
9 Laboratory Functionality 
Index (Hospitals & CHCs) 
18.3 36.3 43.3 58.5 64.5 5.6 31.7 81.8 100 100 100 100 18.2 66.7 83.3 100 96.6 
10 Staffing Index – Meeting 
minimum staff guidelines 
39.3 58.0 66.9 63.9 72.1 10.1 54.0 81.8 93.3 96.7 100 100 18.2 60.0 76.7 76.7 79.3 
11 Provider Knowledge Score* 53.5 69.0 68.7 68.7 N/A 44.8 62.3 81.8 100 100 100 N/A 18.2 86.7 76.7 80.0 N/A 
11a Revised Provider 
Knowledge Score 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 79.3 71.5 86.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 82.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A 20.7 
12 Staff received training in 
last year 
39.0 74.3 68.9 68.5 71.1 30.1 56.3 81.8 93.3 96.7 100 96.6 18.2 90.0 70.0 73.3 72.4 
13 HMIS Index 67.7 65.8 74.9 91.5 92.4 49.6 80.7 81.8 70.0 76.7 100 100 18.2 16.7 43.3 70.0 82.8 
14 Clinical Guidelines Index 34.8 48.9 61.6 78.3 83.9 22.5 51.0 81.8 93.3 100 100 100 18.2 46.7 70.0 93.3 100 
15 Infrastructure Index 55.0 44.6 48.7 54.6 54.1 49.3 63.2 81.8 33.3 46.7 70.0 69.0 18.2 10.0 6.7 16.7 24.1 
16 Patient Record Index 65.6 63.2 69.4 70.0 69.9 56.1 92.5 81.8 70.0 93.3 93.3 93.1 18.2 3.3 3.3 6.7 20.7 
17 Facilities having TB 
register 
15.8 20.6 37.4 53.7 62.9 8.3 26.6 81.8 83.3 96.7 100 100 18.2 36.7 86.7 100 100 
D. Service Provision 
18 Patient History and 
Physical Exam 
70.6 73.5 82.2 83.1 83.9 55.1 83.5 81.8 100 96.7 100 96.6 18.2 26.7 43.3 50.0 51.7 
19 Patient Counseling Index 29.6 35.1 36.6 48.7 48.0 23.3 48.9 81.8 90.0 93.3 96.7 96.6 18.2 16.7 13.3 46.7 44.8 
20 Proper sharps disposal 62.2 52.0 77.5 84.4 75.4 34.1 85.0 81.8 76.7 73.3 90.0 93.1 18.2 10.0 33.3 50.0 31.0 
21 Average new outpatient 
visit per month (BHC > 
750 visits) 
22.2 32.3 55.0 57.4 84.2 6.7 57.1 74.2 83.3 93.3 96.7 100 19.4 40.0 46.7 50.0 79.3 
22 Time spent with patients 
(> 9 min) 
18.0 6.2 7.0 18.4 19.7 3.5 31.2 81.8 70.0 80.0 83.3 86.2 18.2 3.3 3.3 23.3 41.4 
23 BPHS facilities providing 
ANC 
62.0 79.3 84.9 95.3 95.2 28.9 82.8 81.8 93.3 93.3 100 100 18.2 40.0 56.7 90.0 89.7 
24 Delivery care according to 
BPHS 
25.4 22.3 42.3 59.5 71.2 10.5 39.3 81.8 76.7 90.0 100 100 18.2 20.0 60.0 90.0 93.1 
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E. Financial Systems 
25 Facilities with user fee 
guidelines* 
90.6 86.7 82.5 95.9 N/A 80.3 100 81.3 72.4 51.7 72.4 N/A 31.3 31.0 31.0 44.8 N/A 
26 Facilities with exemptions 
for poor patients* 
84.7 93.1 100 100 N/A 64.4 100 81.3 89.7 82.8 96.6 N/A 25.0 37.9 55.2 79.3 N/A 
F. Overall Vision 
27 Females as a % of new 
outpatients 
55.2 57.3 57.8 60.0 60.0 46.5 59.7 81.8 96.7 93.3 96.7 96.6 18.2 20.0 46.7 53.3 48.3 
28 Outpatient visit 
concentration index 
50.5 50.6 51.2 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 81.8 79.3 86.2 82.8 82.1 18.2 31.0 27.6 27.6 89.3 
29 Patient satisfaction 
concentration index 
49.9 49.8 49.8 49.6 49.6 50.0 50.0 81.8 96.6 82.8 96.6 89.3 18.2 3.4 3.5 0.0 7.1 
Composite Scores 
30 % of Upper Benchmarks 
Met 
17.2 31.0 41.4 55.2 N/A 10.3 30.8 84.8 100 96.7 100 N/A 18.2 60.0 83.3 93.3 N/A 
31 % of Lower Benchmarks 
Met 
82.8 89.7 93.1 96.6 N/A 75.9 89.7 78.8 80.0 90.0 100 N/A 21.2 53.3 50.0 83.3 N/A 
 
 Mean scores across 
indicators 1 through 29 
53.2 59.0 65.4 70.2 N/A 48.8 56.5 75.8 86.7 96.7 100 N/A 18.2 70.0 86.7 96.7 N/A 
Revised Composite Scores Indicators listed above with an asterisk (*) are not included in the revised composite score 
32 % of Upper Benchmarks 
Met 
15.4 28.8 38.5 51.9 57.7 7.7 26.9 97.0 100 100 100 100 27.3 66.7 86.7 96.7 100 
33 % of Lower Benchmarks 
Met 
84.6 88.5 92.3 96.2 96.2 69.2 88.5 87.9 90.0 93.3 100 100 30.3 56.7 80.0 93.0 93.1 
 
 Revised mean scores 
across indicators 1 
through 29 
50.4 57.1 61.8 69.0 71.7 46.2 54.9 81.8 90.0 100 100 100 18.2 66.7 86.7 100 100 
Total number of BPHS Facilities 617 629 630 N/A N/A             
Number of BHCs 323 368 385 N/A N/A             
Number of CHCs 243 218 203 N/A N/A             
Number of District Hospitals 51 43 42 N/A N/A             
Sources: Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health. “Afghanistan Health Sector Balanced Scorecard.” 2008, p. 15 
 Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health. “Afghanistan Health Sector Balanced Scorecard: National and Provincial Results.” 2006, p. 5 
 
 
GREEN Score Above Upper Benchmark YELLOW Score Between Benchmarks RED Score Below Lower Benchmark GREY Not Applicable 
 
a
 Score between the bottom and top quintiles 
b
 Highest score in bottom quintile 
c
 Lowest score in the top quintile 
d
 Shura-e-sehie, community health forums 
e
 Benchmark fixed at 90% 
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Table 17: Afghanistan Health Sector Balanced Scorecard Provincial Results 2004 – 2008: Nangarhar Province 
  Benchmarks Nangarhar 
  Lowera Upperb 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
A. Patients and Community 
1 Overall Patient Satisfaction 66.4 90.9 85.5 75.5 70.0 60.4 66.3 
2 Patient Perception of Quality Index 66.2 83.9 76.0 73.8 67.5 64.1 75.2 
3 Written Shura-e-sehie activitiesc 18.1 66.5 46.9 15.7 36.4 80.0 95.8 
B. Staff 
4 Health Worker Satisfaction Index 56.1 67.9 64.1 62.3 64.5 68.1 66.2 
5 Salary Payments current 52.4 92.0 66.0 85.2 39.9 97.4 53.2 
C. Capacity for Service Provision 
6 Equipment Functionality Indexd 61.3 90.0 74.1 53.3 76.7 85.1 85.9 
7 Drug Availability Index 53.3 81.8 65.3 68.4 55.1 76.8 76.5 
8 Family Planning Availability Index 43.4 80.3 49.8 50.3 86.1 81.0 87.8 
9 Laboratory Functionality Index (Hospitals & CHCs) 5.6 31.7 33.9 36.2 52.0 62.4 69.9 
10 Staffing Index – Meeting minimum staff guidelines 10.1 54.0 59.8 57.4 64.4 71.5 76.6 
11 Provider Knowledge Score* 44.8 62.3 58.3 62.8 76.9 74.6 N/A 
11a Revised Provider Knowledge Score 71.5 86.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 79.3 
12 Staff received training in last year 30.1 56.3 42.0 53.5 56.4 74.8 55.9 
13 HMIS Index 49.6 80.7 54.7 42.2 82.5 92.0 91.7 
14 Clinical Guidelines Index 22.5 51.0 58.6 42.7 82.8 72.3 89.0 
15 Infrastructure Index 49.3 63.2 53.2 44.9 48.6 53.5 51.1 
16 Patient Record Index 56.1 92.5 59.5 57.3 65.9 66.0 70.2 
17 Facilities having TB register 8.3 26.6 46.7 42.8 75.6 88.0 62.9 
D. Service Provision 
18 Patient History and Physical Exam Index 55.1 83.5 55.6 56.0 76.4 84.8 80.7 
19 Patient Counseling Index 23.3 48.9 21.2 17.3 32.6 46.6 60.4 
20 Proper sharps disposal 34.1 85.0 64.0 8.7 100 71.8 63.2 
21 Avg. new outpatient visit per month (BHC > 750 visits) 6.7 57.1 80.0 91.7 100 86.7 100 
22 Time spent with patients (> 9 min) 3.5 31.2 22.5 3.8 6.9 27.4 13.0 
23 BPHS facilities providing ANC 28.9 82.8 53.3 54.7 91.9 92.0 87.5 
24 Delivery care according to BPHS 10.5 39.3 6.5 4.2 48.1 47.6 71.2 
E. Financial Systems 
25 Facilities with user fee guidelines* 80.3 100.0 86.0 86.5 92.6 95.9 N/A 
26 Facilities with exemptions for poor patients* 64.4 100.0 85.4 87.2 87.8 88.0 N/A 
F. Overall Vision 
27 Females as a % of new outpatients 46.5 59.7 59.0 58.2 60.5 60.1 65.5 
28 Outpatient visit concentration index 50.0 50.0 47.9 48.1 48.1 47.7 49.9 
29 Patient satisfaction concentration index 50.0 50.0 49.3 49.3 49.7 49.8 49.0 
Composite Scores 
30 % of Upper Benchmarks Met 10.3 30.8 17.2 17.2 44.8 55.2 N/A 
31 % of Lower Benchmarks Met 75.9 89.7 86.2 75.9 93.1 89.7 N/A 
 Mean scores across indicators 1 through 29 48.8 56.5 56.0 51.4 65.4 71.3 N/A 
Revised Composite Scores Indicators with asterisks (*) not included in revised composite score 
 % of Upper Benchmarks Met 7.7 26.9 19.2 15.4 46.2 57.7 46.2 
 % of Lower Benchmarks Met 69.2 88.5 88.5 73.1 92.3 88.5 96.2 
 Revised mean scores: indicators 1 through 29 46.2 54.9 53.7 48.2 63.0 69.5 69.8 
Number of Facilities   24 25 25 25 25 
Number of observations of patient-provider interactions   234 237 249 246 250 
Number of exit interviews   233 252 249 246 243 
Number of health workers interviewed   55 61 67 84 94 
Number of CHWs interviewed   3 35 33 89 N/A 
Sources: Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health. “Afghanistan Health Sector Balanced Scorecard.” 2008, p. 89 
Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health. “Afghanistan Health Sector Balanced Scorecard: National and 
Provincial Results.” 2006, p. 32 
GREEN Score Above 
Upper Benchmark 
YELLOW Score Between 
Benchmarks 
RED Score Below 
Lower Benchmark 
GREY Not Applicable 
 
a
 Highest score in the bottom quintile 
b
 Lowest score in the top quintile 
c
 Shura-e-seshie, community health forums 
d
 Benchmark fixed at 90%   
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APPENDIX B 
ABBREVIATION INDEX 
ACTION – Advocacy for Controlling Tuberculosis Internationally 
ADB – Asian Development Bank 
AHC – Alliance Health Committee 
AMA – American Medical Association 
ANA – Afghan National Army 
ANP – Afghan National Police 
ARCS – Afghan Red Crescent Society 
AREU – Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 
ARI – Acute Respiratory Infection 
BHC – Basic Health Center 
BPHS – Basic Package of Health Services 
BPHS-SM – Basic Package of Health Services Strengthening Mechanism 
BSC – Balanced Scorecard 
CHC – Comprehensive Health Center 
CHW – Community Health Worker 
CMC – Coordination of Medical Committees 
EC – European Commission 
EOC – Emergency Obstetrical Care 
EPHS – Essential Package of Hospital Services 
EPI – Expanded Program of Immunization Clinic 
HIV/AIDS – Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
HNI – HealthNet International 
HoO – High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption 
HP – Health Post 
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross 
IED – Improvised Explosive Device 
IMR – Infant Mortality Rate 
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force 
JDM – Joint Donor Mission 
MHC – Maternal and Child Health Clinic 
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MICS – Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 
MMR – Maternal Mortality Rate 
MoPH – Ministry of Public Health 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization 
NID – National Immunization Day 
NWFP – Northwestern Frontier Province 
PHD – Provincial Health Department 
PHR – Physicians for Human Rights 
PPA – Performance-based Partnership Agreement 
PSI – Population Services International 
PTSD – Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
SMI – Safe Motherhood Initiative 
STI – Sexually Transmitted Infection 
SWAp – Sector-Wide Approach 
TB – Tuberculosis 
TBA – Traditional Birth Attendant 
TPO – Transcultural Psychological Association 
U5MR – Under 5 Mortality Rate 
UN – United Nations 
UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund 
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund 
US – United States 
USAID – United States Agency for International Development 
WHO – World Health Organization 
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